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There is a need to identify how the elimination of a performance pay system 
influences effective teachers’ retention decisions at high-needs schools.  Careful 
consideration should be given when implementing and eliminating performance-based 
pay programs because teacher behaviors change under monetary incentive-based 
programs.  With student achievement as the primary goal of performance pay, an equally 
important issue that is not yet understood is how teachers perceive the influence of 
performance pay on student achievement.  
A qualitative phenomenology methodology was used to determine how teachers 
make sense of performance pay through their experiences with the elimination of an 
established performance-based pay system and how these experiences influence retention 
decisions and perceptions of student achievement in urban middle schools with high-
poverty and high-minority student populations.  As effective teachers within their 
schools, the participants were uniquely positioned to provide valuable insight on their 
perceptions of the elimination of a performance pay system. 
This study determined that teachers perceive the elimination of an established 
performance pay system to increase teacher attrition at high-needs schools and will result 
 viii 
in a decline in student achievement at these same high-needs schools. This research study 
expands the literature on teacher perceptions of performance pay and encourages district 
leaders to work collaboratively with school leaders and teachers to develop incentive 
plans for retention and student achievement at high-needs schools.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT OF STUDY 
Background 
Student learning is the critical and pivotal goal of all schools and districts, and the 
problem faced by these entities is the inconsistency in the quality of teachers and instruction 
from year to year. “The quality of the teaching force is largely determined by the pay that 
teachers receive” (Alexander, Salmon, & Alexander, 2015, p. 256).  With a need to increase 
teacher effectiveness, many districts are making an effort to reward and retain effective teachers 
by moving to performance-based pay systems (Lavy, 2007).  Providing adequate and competitive 
compensation is also necessary in the teacher labor market due to school districts having to 
compete with neighboring districts, teacher shortages, and the business community. 
 It is common knowledge in the educational realm that an effective teacher has the 
greatest impact on student learning (Alexander et al., 2015).  While programs, resources, and 
initiatives come and go on a yearly basis, one factor that remains constant in influencing student 
learning is quality instruction.  Three consecutive years of average but effective instruction can 
completely change the academic trajectory of low-achieving students, moving them from the 
lowest to the highest quartile in academic performance (Schmoker, 2011).  Consequently, 
growing, developing, and retaining effective teachers are priorities of campus and district leaders 
each school year. 
 The need for quality, effective teachers is critical in all schools, but even more so in 
urban schools with predominantly low-socioeconomic and minority populations.  “It is a known 
fact that most large urban districts and many isolated rural districts across the country have 
teacher shortages, have been forced to hire less-qualified teachers, and have difficulty competing 
in their markets for good teachers” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 397).  As a result, teacher turnover 
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is high, which has an impact on student learning due to the lack of consistently effective 
instruction each school year.  Across the United States, approximately half a million teachers 
leave their schools each year.  Only 16% of this teacher attrition at schools is due to retirement. 
The remaining 84% of the teacher turnover is due to teachers transferring between schools or 
leaving the profession entirely (Boyd et al., 2011).   
Attrition issues vary greatly among different types of schools within the same geographic 
areas, even though schools are drawing from the same supply pool of teacher candidates.   In 
some instances, schools within the same metropolitan area have waiting lists of qualified 
candidates for their openings while other schools within the same proximity have difficulty 
recruiting and hiring qualified teachers for open positions.  Schools that report difficulties in 
filling their vacancies are the same schools that have above-average turnover rates.  These 
school-to-school differences are often due to a student population with poverty rates of more 
than 50%, with teacher attrition 50% higher in the higher-poverty public schools than low-
poverty public schools (Ingersoll, 2001).   Subsequently, high-poverty, high-minority schools 
consistently receive teachers who are underqualified and have little to no experience (Darling-
Hammond, 2003). 
Retention directly impacts teacher quality and the lack of retention results in the 
economic costs of recruiting, hiring, and training new teachers, which far exceeds the cost of 
retaining effective teachers (Brill & McCartney, 2008).  With student learning as the ultimate 
goal, retaining effective teachers is critical in affecting student performance, and performance-
based pay programs are one of the common strategies for doing so.  The single salary schedule 
that has dominated the teacher labor market for the last fifty years or so has compensated 
teachers based on years of experience and their level of education (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  
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Originating in the Denver and Des Moines school districts in 1921, this compensation model has 
proven ineffective in positively affecting student performance (Jones, 2013).  An example of the 
single salary approach is in the Houston Independent School District (HISD), where teacher 
salary is determined by years of service only.  According to the 2016-2017 HISD compensation 
manual, teachers with 0-2 years of experience are paid $51,500 per year and teachers can earn a 
maximum of $71,500 after thirty-five years of service. Within those years, referred to as steps, 
teachers progress up the salary schedule for each year of service and earn anywhere from $250 to 
$500 more for each step.  
 Performance-based pay systems designed to incentivize individuals to work harder and 
more efficiently date back to the early 1900’s in the United States. The first documented 
performance-based pay system was implemented in 1908 in Newton, Massachusetts.  The 
implementation of performance pay systems saw growth during both the Nixon and Reagan 
administrations, but few experienced success in accomplishing their goals (Brewer, Myers, & 
Zhang, 2015).  Compensation is one of the factors that surfaces most frequently in influencing 
teacher retention decisions (Pesavento-Conway, 2011).  Consequently, educational reforms often 
focus on monetary incentives to reward and retain effective teachers.   
In recent years, policy makers have experimented with performance-based pay as a 
strategy to compensate and retain teachers based on student achievement.  Since 2005 when 
California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger suggested compensating teachers based on merit, 
governors across the country have continued to make proposals for performance-based pay for 
the teachers in their states (Odden & Picus, 2008).   For example, performance-based pay 
systems in Tennessee, Austin, and New York City were implemented to increase student 
achievement, all varying in design and effectiveness.  Tennessee’s Project STAR performance 
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pay program resulted in improved student achievement in math by three percentage points, but 
had no statistical impact on reading achievement (Dee & Keys, 2004).   Similarly, Austin 
Independent School District’s REACH performance pay program showed positive impacts on 
student achievement on the Texas standardized assessments, but little impact on mastery of 
school-created student learning objectives (Balch & Springer, 2015).  In contrast, the New York 
City School-Wide Performance Bonus Program showed little correlation between performance 
pay and student achievement, which was attributed to the whole-school pay out design 
(Goodman & Turner, 2011). 
Performance-based pay systems in other states have shown a positive correlation between 
performance pay and teacher retention.  North Carolina’s Bonus Program provided incentive pay 
to retain teachers at academically low-performing campuses with high percentages of students in 
poverty, resulting in a reduced turnover rate of approximately 12% (Clotfelter et al., 2006).  
Denver’s Professional Compensation Systems for Teachers (ProComp), Minnesota’s Q-Comp 
program, and Florida’s Merit Award Program (MAP) are further examples of systems that 
provided teachers with opportunities to earn performance pay based on student achievement and 
performance evaluation as well as their knowledge and skills.  Through analysis of these 
programs, Podgursky and Springer (2007) found that incentive-based systems motivate and 
attract teachers who prefer to prosper under that type of compensation plan and that retaining 
effective teachers does require some type of incentive or performance pay.   
Context of Performance Pay in Southeast Texas School District  
 Many districts are attempting to create a compensation system that awards teachers for 
performance rather than just years of service and education.  There are various ways to do so, 
including performance bonuses, career-pathway stipends, hard-to-staff incentives, and career 
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ladder schedules.  The most common model for paying teachers based on student achievement is 
the value-added model, which measures student progress from the previous year by the use of 
standardized assessments (Caillier, 2010).  Value-added models are designed to determine 
teacher impact on student learning by grouping students and tracking their progress on 
standardized test scores, quantifying teachers’ effect on student growth over time (Amrein-
Beardsly, Pivovarova, & Greiger, 2016).  Because many variables have an impact on student 
performance on standardized assessments, critics of performance pay systems argue that 
implementing a system that consistently identifies effective teachers and awards them 
appropriately, is difficult to achieve (Dee & Keys, 2004, p. 2004).   
 Although the salaries are relatively high compared to other school districts in the teacher labor 
market within the Southeast Texas area, Southeast Texas School District implemented one of the nation’s 
largest performance-based pay system in 2007 in order to award effective teachers for student 
achievement through performance bonuses.  Under the Teacher Performance Compensation Award 
Program (TPCAP), the single salary schedule remained intact for base pay and the performance pay 
bonuses served as additional compensation linked to student performance on standardized exams, using 
the value-added model (Olson, 2007).  The TPCAP program ended following the 2015-2016 school year 
due to decreased funding (District Administrator, personal communication, January 23, 2017).   
 There are currently twenty-three schools within the Southeast Texas School District that are still 
participating in an extended version of the TPCAP performance pay program, which is designed to award 
teachers for their students’ performance on the State of Texas Assessment of Academic Readiness 
(STAAR).  These schools were also participants in the original TPCAP program, but were identified as 
schools that needed further incentives to improve student achievement.  According to a Southeast Texas 
School District administrator, who referenced a program evaluation of the performance pay program, 
retention of core academic teachers increased from 81.8% in 2012-2013 to 83.2% in 2014-2015.  Also, 
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the percentage of teachers receiving performance pay bonuses at high-needs schools increased from 
19.7% in 2012-2013 to 26.2% in 2014-2015 (Personal communication, February 8, 2017).  
The current group of schools were identified for participation based on historically low mastery 
rates on STAAR and high rates of economically disadvantaged students. The performance pay program 
for these schools is funded through the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program grant, which is a federal 
grant program designed to provide districts with funding to develop and implement performance-based 
compensation systems in high-needs schools (“USDE”, 2017).   The TIF grant has funded performance 
pay at the twenty-three schools, which includes twenty-one elementary schools and four middle schools, 
since the 2013-2014 school year.  Funding will conclude at the end of the 2016-2017 school year (District 
Administrator, personal communication, January 23, 2017).  Therefore, the effective teachers at these 
high-poverty, high-minority schools with a history of poor academic performance will no longer receive 
performance pay for their students’ academic achievement.   
Problem Statement 
 There is a need to identify how the elimination of a performance pay system influences 
effective teachers’ retention decisions at high-needs schools.  Performance pay influences 
teachers’ behaviors, and since teachers respond to incentives, careful consideration should be 
given when implementing and discontinuing performance-based pay programs (Jones, 2013).  
The current performance pay program in Southeast Texas School District awards teachers for 
student achievement in schools with historically low academic performance and high rates of 
economically disadvantaged students.  With student achievement as the primary goal of 
performance pay, an equally important issue that is not yet understood is how teachers perceive 
the influence of performance pay on student achievement.  
The attrition of teachers in high-poverty, high-minority schools in Texas, Georgia, New 
York and North Carolina reflect the trend of teachers leaving schools with high concentrations of 
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poor students and minority students.  Hanushek et al. (2004) explain that schools serving large 
numbers of academically disadvantaged, black, or Hispanic students lose significantly more 
teachers to other districts and other professions than affluent or low-poverty schools with higher 
academic achievement.  While economic status and academic performance influence teachers’ 
attrition decisions, Lankford et al. (2002) state that student demographics has an even stronger 
impact, as qualified teachers leave schools where the proportion of nonwhite students is at least 
75% greater than the schools they are transferring to and transfer to schools where the portion of 
poor students is 50% less.   These attrition trends result in the minority and economically 
disadvantaged students systematically having new and inexperienced teachers, thus adversely 
affecting academic achievement. 
With the intent of performance pay being to increase the quality of teachers to improve 
student academic achievement, prevent attrition, and retain teachers at high-needs campuses to 
prevent the trend of effective teachers moving to schools that serve relatively high-performing 
and economically sound students (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006), the desire for 
districts across the nation to establish a tighter link between teachers’ effectiveness in the 
classroom and their compensation influences current policy in public schools (DeAngelis & 
Dang, 2016).  While there is no one-size-fits all approach to performance-based pay design and 
implementation, and the measures used to determine teacher effectiveness vary greatly, the goal 
of such compensation plans is to award teachers for student achievement.  Careful design and 
implementation are critical to the success of any performance-based pay program, and “the 
incentive structure created needs not only promote teacher effectiveness but also be fiscally 
feasible if the program is to be sustained” (DeAngelis & Dang, 2016, p. 16).  Therefore, 
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discontinuing performance pay for teachers who have shown positive impacts on student 
achievement can have lasting implications within the context of high-needs schools.   
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study was to determine how effective teachers make sense of 
performance pay through their experiences with the elimination of an established performance-
based pay system and how these experiences influence teachers’ retention decisions in 
academically low-performing schools with high portions of economically disadvantaged and 
minority students.   One goal of the study was to understand how teachers perceive performance 
pay influencing their decisions to remain in their current positions at high-poverty, high-minority 
schools.  As second goal of the study was to explain how teachers perceive student achievement 
to be influenced by performance pay.  The following research questions were used to guide the 
study: 
 For urban high-poverty, high-minority middle schools in Southeast Texas- 
1. To what extent does the elimination of performance pay influence teacher retention 
decisions? 
2. How do teachers perceive the influence of performance pay on student achievement? 
3. How do teachers make sense of their experience with performance pay? 
Definition of Terms 
 Performance-based Pay- Financial incentives in the form of a cash bonus whenever 
student scores on standardized assessments achieve particular metrics (Jones, 2013). 
 High-Poverty- Public schools where more than 75% of the students are eligible for free 
or reduce-price lunch (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017, retrieved from: 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_clb.asp).  
9 
 
 High-Minority- For the purposes of this study, high-minority is defined as more than 
50% of the student population as being non-white.   
 Effective Teachers- For the purposes of this study, effective teachers are defined as 
teachers who have received performance pay bonuses for student achievement for the last two 
school years at minimum.   
 Low-performing Schools- “Schools that are in the bottom 10 percent of performance in 
the State, or who have significant achievement gaps, based on student academic performance in 
reading/language arts and mathematics on the assessments required under the ESEA or 
graduation rates” (U.S. Department of Education, 2012, retrieved from: 
https://www.ed.gov/race-top/district-competition/definitions.)  
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The design of this study presented in the following chapter was informed by research on 
teacher labor markets and performance pay designs, large scale performance-based pay systems 
intended to reward student achievement, and teacher attrition in schools with large portions of 
poor and minority students.   This chapter is structured as follows.  The first section presents a 
brief history of teacher labor markets and performance-based pay designs.  The second sections 
covers research on actual large-scale performance pay systems in practice. The purpose of this 
section is to provide examples of performance-based pay systems and their correlation to teacher 
retention and student achievement, as the intent of performance pay in these systems is to reward 
teachers for student academic performance.  Because this study explored the relationship 
between performance pay and the retention of effective teachers in high-poverty and high-
minority schools, the final section reviews the literature on teacher attrition in schools with these 
demographics.   
Teacher Labor Markets  
According to Jones (2013), economic theory suggests that performance pay programs can change 
teachers’ motivation, cooperation, and attrition decisions.  The competitive nature of teacher labor 
markets, and the need for teachers to provide quality instruction in high-needs schools, cause districts to 
develop tools for recruiting and retaining teachers through such incentives as salary increases, sign-on 
bonuses, incentive pay, and performance pay.  According to Lavy (2007), “tying teachers’ pay to their 
classroom performance should improve the current educational system both by clarifying teaching goals 
and by attracting and retaining the most productive teachers” (p. 87).  Extrinsic motivation in the form of 
monetary awards is designed to encourage teachers to constantly thrive to improve performance to meet 
district goals and remain in the profession, therefore exhausting more effort due to the possibility of 
reward (Firestone, 2014). 
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 Supporters of performance-based pay compare it to the business community that pays individuals 
based on knowledge and skills and how those attributes contribute to company performance, resulting in 
performance bonuses (Odden & Picus, 2008).  Using only a single salary schedule contradicts this, and 
instead treats educators as if their opportunities based on knowledge and skill are the same both inside 
and outside of the labor market (DeAngelis & Dang, 2016).  So ideally, performance-based pay systems 
would encourage teachers to continue to grow and develop in an effort to align themselves with the 
district’s student performance goals.  These “market incentives” (Clotfelter et al., 2006, p. 3) in education 
bring cost-benefit analysis to the conversation, as the benefits of higher quality teachers come with the 
costs of higher compensation expenditures.   
 Teacher labor markets are partially influenced by supply and demand, as the demand for 
teachers is determined by the number of students needing education.  However, applying supply 
and demand theory in a simplistic sense would suggest that teacher salaries rising significantly 
would entice more people to enter the profession, therefore leading to an oversaturation of the 
market and a lower competitive salary.  Therefore, teacher salaries are not determined based on 
supply and demand.  Instead, the teacher labor markets function more as an oligopoly, as the 
states control the majority of the output through teacher certifications and school accreditations 
(Alexander et al., 2015).   
 From an economic perspective, gaining an understanding of the variations in performance-based 
pay systems, as well as the impact that performance pay has on student achievement and teacher 
retention, will provide insight as to the types of incentives that have the most impact on achievement and 
retention.  While most districts use student performance on standardized assessments to determine the 
effectiveness of teacher performance, there are other subjective factors utilized in other instances such as 
teacher appraisals.  In all cases, performance pay appears to be unstable from year to year, which can 
cause the total expenditures spent on performance pay to be a bit unpredictable.   Examining how districts 
determine and award effective teachers based on performance is one goal of the following review of 
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literature on performance-based pay systems, as well as how these incentive programs consequently 
influence teacher retention.  In regard to teacher retention, the cost of performance pay in an effort to 
improve student achievement and retain effective teachers ideally would outweigh the cost of continuous 
recruitment, hiring, sign-on bonuses, professional development for new teachers, and instructional 
resources needed to supplement poor instruction. 
Performance-Based Pay Systems 
 The single-salary schedule for compensating teachers has been traditional practice for the 
majority of the 20th century.  This traditional system pays teachers based on years of experience and level 
of education (Conley & Oden, 1995).  The major limitations and criticisms of the single-salary schedule 
include its inability to provide incentives to teachers to acquire new skills and provide standards-based 
instruction, its inability to respond to the labor market forces, and the lack of correlation between 
education and experience with improved student achievement (Baratz-Snowden, 2007).  Various 
alternative compensation systems have been created to align the intersects of teachers with the goals of 
the districts in which they work (Adams, Heywood, & Rothstein, 2009).  Performance-based pay systems 
are the most relevant to this study and will therefore be the focus of the literature review. 
 Depending on the compensation structure, performance pay is also referred to as variable 
pay and merit pay, and is considered to be at least one component of effective compensation 
plans.  Odden and Picus (2008) support a salary structure that is designed to support the goals of 
the district, and believe that rewarding teachers based on student achievement motivates teachers 
to improve student learning. Performance pay can be awarded to an entire school based on 
campus student performance, to individual teachers based on the performance of students in their 
classrooms, or a combination of campus awards and teacher awards.  It is believed that providing 
whole-school bonuses eliminates competition among the teaching staff, and that individual 
awards cause unhealthy competition and negatively impact morale (Odden & Picus, 2008).  
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While the school-wide payouts are less controversial, Odden and Picus (2008) recommend 
“designing bonus programs for individual teachers as well as groups of teachers” (p. 415). 
 Support for Performance-based Pay Systems.  Springer and Gardner (2010) are also in 
support of performance-based pay systems that award teachers as a means to improve 
instructional quality and consequently student learning.  Data from a 1996 study by William 
Sanders was utilized to emphasize the need for effective teachers, citing “a difference of 50 
percentile points in student achievement between students who encountered three consecutive 
years of teachers at or above the 80th percentile of performance” (Springer & Gardner, 2010, p. 
11).   A later study completed by Hanushek and Rivin in 2004 was also used to support the 
impact of effective teachers, explaining that students who have effective teachers for five years 
in a row are able to close the achievement gap that exists among students who qualify for free or 
reduced lunch (Springer & Gardner, 2010).   
 Both prior studies are used to bring context to support the argument of the positive 
impact that performance pay will have on awarding effective teachers.  It is stated that “pay for 
performance will tend to attract and retain individuals who are particularly good at the activities 
to which the incentives are attached, and they will repel those who are not” (Springer & Gardner, 
2010, p. 12).  In connection to their statement, performance pay could therefore impact teacher 
retention decisions of effective teachers, which would then positively impact student 
achievement.  
 Also a proponent of performance pay as a means to improve the quality of teachers, Lavy 
(2007) examines both the benefits and drawbacks of performance-based salary structures.   The 
benefit of performance pay is its positive impact on productivity and efficiency.  In regard to 
efficiency, performance pay aligns incentives with expectations of teachers, schools, and 
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students.  Lavy (2007) states that pay incentives “provide teachers or schools with powerful 
signals about what is valued and what is not” (p. 90).   Efficiency is also improved through 
performance incentives by addressing the gaps between teachers’ efforts and their perceptions of 
what is important for student learning.  Performance pay motivates teachers to engage in 
activities that result in student learning gains despite their hesitation to complete the task due to 
more workload (Lavy 2007).  Lavy (2007), like Springer and Gardner (2010), believes that an 
effectively designed performance pay system will recruit and retain effective teachers while 
naturally discouraging ineffective ones.  Also, efficiency is improved because performance pay 
will motivate teachers to continue to improve their craft through professional development, 
which also will impact achievement.  Productivity is increased by encouraging better governance 
on the part of administrators, because campus leaders must monitor closely and evaluate the 
effectiveness of their teachers and the quality of instruction on their campuses (Lavy, 2007). 
 Criticism of Performance-Based Pay. The potential negative effects of performance-
based pay systems include measurement problems, negative effects on teacher collaboration, and 
focus on only tested curriculum and students with the highest probability of meeting 
performance goals.  Establishing agreed upon goals and then accurately assessing the progress 
toward those goals can be problematic.  This is true for both objective and subjective 
measurements (Lavy, 2007).   The most commonly used measures of teacher performance in 
relation to student achievement or student growth on standardized assessments are not reflective 
of the all of the factors that influence student achievement (Briggs & Domingue, 2011).  The 
value-added model is used most frequently in large school districts with the goal of measuring 
the causal relationship between the teacher and student performance from one school year to the 
next, using only student achievement data on standardized assessments to determine the 
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effectiveness of the teacher in adding value and growth to students’ learning (Briggs & 
Domingue, 2011).  It is also complex to “identify the contributions of previous teachers” (Lavy, 
2007, p. 92).  These performance measures result in increased criticism for performance-based 
pay due to the single-measure of teacher performance being student achievement on standardized 
assessments.  
 Lavy (2007) also brings unintended consequences of performance pay to light, such as 
teachers only teaching the subjects and curriculum that will be used for measurement.  Often 
referred to as “teaching to the test”, focusing performance measures solely on student 
achievement on standardized tests can cause a narrowing of the curriculum to only tested 
subjects and curriculum.  With such a disproportionate amount of weight being placed on these 
specific student assessments, “other valuable activities might get slighted” (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007, p. 928).  This can lead to students not receiving an interdisciplinary curriculum 
that includes social science and fine arts because of the emphasis on achievement in math and 
reading.  Performance pay can also create an environment that encourages teachers to focus 
instructional time and interventions on the students who can make the most progress toward to 
specified measureable goals, which can lead to the extremely high and low academic students 
receiving the least effective instruction for their learning needs. (Lavy, 2007). 
 A final criticism of performance-based pay is the negative impact is has on teachers’ 
behaviors.  Jones (2013) investigated the impact of incentive pay on teacher effort, cooperation, 
and retention by using data from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) from 2003 and 2007.  
The intent of the research was to determine how teacher behaviors changed in regard to actual 
hours worked, as well as time spent on collaborative activities, when a pay incentive was 
available. Evidence from the study indicates that performance pay impacts teacher behaviors in a 
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variety of ways, both positive and negative.  It is concluded that teachers who work in 
performance pay districts work 12% fewer hours per week than teachers in non-performance pay 
districts, and also spent more time pursuing other job opportunities.   Jones (2013) also states that 
teachers’ participation in non-paid activities decreases in performance pay districts.  While 
motivation to participate in non-compensated activities appears to decline, teacher attrition rates 
also decline significantly in districts with performance pay structures (Jones, 2013).    
 Performance pay impacts teachers’ behaviors, most notably when it comes to retention.  
With the goal of retaining effective teachers to increase the quality of instruction, the Jones 
(2013) study supports performance pay as a tool to do so.  It does, also, shed light on unintended 
consequences such as lack of effort or motivation to participate in unpaid activities, all of which 
impact student achievement.  This further supports Jones’s statement that “since teachers 
respond to incentives, careful consideration should be given to how performance pay is 
implemented” (Jones, 2013, p. 163). 
 In order for performance pay systems to achieve the desired results of student 
achievement and teacher retention, Marsh and McCaffrey (2011) suggest essential components 
to ensure a successful program.  These components include the need for teachers to understand 
clearly the program design and functionality, believe they are capable of earning a substantive 
award within a reasonable timeline, and perceive that the system is fair and therefore commit to 
the program.  Supporters of awarding performance pay based on value-added measurements of 
teacher quality believe that pay incentives motivate teachers to improve student learning.  Critics 
believe that performance pay motivates novice teachers more than experienced teachers who 
prefer to work in higher socioeconomic neighborhoods and academically successfully campuses.  
Critics also suggest that merit pay has no proof of success in making teachers more effective 
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(Alexander et al., 2015).  While there are various perspectives on teacher salary structures, all of 
the literature finds at least some positive aspects of performance-based pay.  The policies that 
govern personnel practices and funding for compensation of teachers significantly influence the 
quality of education in school districts, and should therefore be created at the district level to 
meet identified needs.  These personnel policies should focus on processes that are designed to 
recruit, develop, and retain teachers in order to improve student learning and reach instructional 
goals (Alexander et. al, 2015).    
Performance-based Pay Systems in Practice 
Performance pay systems are a popular component of public education reform, but the 
design of these systems vary drastically from state to state and even district to district.  
Variations occur in compensation awards that range from large group, small group, and 
individual pay outs based on student achievement (Springer & Taylor, 2016).  Differences also 
are seen also in measures used to determine effective performance, with some using value-added 
measures and others utilizing yearly district-set student achievement standards.  Understanding 
the effective characteristics of past and current systems is essential for policy development and 
implementation.  
Tennessee Career Ladder Evaluation System.  In an early study completed by Dee and 
Keys (2004), an evaluation of the merit pay system in Tennessee was completed with the goal of 
determining if the performance pay system actually rewarded effective teachers as indicated by 
student achievement.   To evaluate the argument that performance pay systems do not adequately 
determine and award effective teachers, their study analyzed data from the Tennessee Career 
Ladder Evaluation system and the Project Student Achievement Teacher Ratio (STAR) class-
size experiment.  The career ladder system provided opportunities for teachers to earn salary 
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rewards for student achievement along with non-salary rewards such professional leadership 
responsibilities, and no quota was established for the number of teachers eligible for receipt of 
monetary and non-monetary awards (Dee & Keys, 2004).  Project STAR was an experiment with 
class size reduction with seventy-nine schools across the state.  Teachers in this study were 
randomly selected and consisted of a mixture of career-ladder and non-career ladder teachers.   
 The results indicate that the career-ladder teachers, also identified as effective teachers, 
did have a greater impact on student achievement in math by three percentage points but no 
statistical impact on reading achievement.  However, the results reveal that the merit pay system 
in Tennessee was relatively accurate in rewarding effective teachers who had a positive impact 
on student performance.  Also, the career ladder teachers that were identified as novice and 
probationary had a stronger impact on math achievement than veteran teachers.  This suggests 
the program’s effectiveness in recruiting effective teachers (Dee & Keys, 2004).  Based on these 
findings, performance pay systems that award individual teachers based on their students’ 
performance do impact student achievement.  While the impact is low, rewarding effective 
teachers with merit pay can result in continued increases in student achievement through teacher 
motivation.  
North Carolina Bonus Program.  Focusing on the need to increase quality instruction 
by retaining effective teachers, Clotfelter et al. (2006) conducted an analysis of the effectiveness 
of North Carolina’s performance pay system that spanned from the 2001-2002 school year 
through the 2003-2004 school year.  The program was designed to recruit and retain qualified 
math, science, and special education teachers in middle schools and high schools that were hard-
to-staff due to the student populations.  The pay incentive was a permanent $1800 bonus for 
remaining at their assigned school and in one of the positions identified.  The study was designed 
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to measure the impact of incentive pay in retaining teachers at low-performing and high-poverty 
campuses.  (Clotfelter et al., 2006).   
 The results of the study reflect that incentive pay positively impacted teachers’ decisions 
to remain at the campuses in their North Carolina district.  An average of $1800 per year 
“reduces turnover rates of the targeted teachers by roughly 12%” (Clotfelter et al., 2006, p. 4).  
The teachers who were retained due to the incentive were mostly those with ten to thirty years of 
teaching experience, with little evidence supporting the impact on novice teachers.  It was also 
revealed that the percentage of teachers retained due to the incentive pay could have been higher, 
but misunderstanding about the program led teachers to leave without clarity on their actual 
eligibility for the award (Clotfelter et al., 2006).  North Carolina discontinued this program after 
just three years due to the discontinuation of funding, so the long term impact on student 
achievement was not measured.  However, this study does provide evidence that incentive pay 
can motivate teachers to remain in their position, leading to higher retention rates of effective 
teachers and therefore possibly impacting student achievement. 
Large-Scale Performance Pay Programs.  In 2007, Podgursky and Springer evaluated 
several large-scale salary programs that utilize performance as a means to compensate teachers.  
Specific performance-based teacher pay programs were reviewed in Denver, Texas, Minnesota 
and Florida, all with variations in the program structures and amounts of pay-out awarded.  
Denver’s Professional Compensation Systems for Teachers (ProComp), Minnesota’s Q-Comp 
program, and Florida’s Merit Award Program (MAP) had a salary schedule that provided 
teachers opportunities to earn performance pay based on student achievement and performance 
evaluation as well as their knowledge and skills.  Texas’s Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant 
(GEEG) awarded teachers based on objective measures of student achievement only. Theoretical 
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arguments both for and against performance-related pay programs were presented and empirical 
research on teacher effect studies and actual performance-based experiments were compared to 
reveal a mostly positive effect of teacher incentive programs on student achievement (Podgursky 
& Springer, 2007). 
 Through analysis of the multiple performance pay systems in practice as of 2007, 
Podgursky and Springer (2007) find that incentive-based systems motivate and attract teachers 
who prefer to prosper under that type of compensation plan, and that retaining effective teachers 
does require some type of incentive or performance pay.  While there is no conclusion drawn on 
how merit pay impacts student achievement through their study, they do emphasize the fact that 
if traditional salary schedules are not replaced with ones that have some aspect of performance 
tied to compensation, “districts will find themselves devoting ever larger expenditures to 
schedule-driven pay increases that are unlikely to have effect on student achievement” 
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007, p. 945).  This study does not reveal any correlation between 
performance pay and student achievement, but it does encourage a performance pay system to 
attract and reward, and hopefully retain, effective teachers, which will consequently impact 
student achievement.  
New York City School-Wide Performance Bonus Program.  Evidence on the effects 
of performance pay on math and reading student achievement was analyzed by looking at data in 
the public schools in New York City that participated in the School-Wide Performance Bonus 
Program.  In this performance pay system, teachers received bonuses based on overall school 
performance rather than the performance of students in their individual classrooms (Goodman & 
Turner, 2011).  This group award design was implemented to reduce the competition of teachers 
and increase collaboration, which supports one of the drawbacks that Lavy (2007) refers to when 
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using a performance-based system that pays individual teachers based on the achievement of 
students in their classrooms. 
 The school-wide performance bonus program in New York City targeted 158 high-needs 
schools that were defined as serving grades kindergarten through eighth grade and having high 
percentages of English Language Learners, special education students, and students on free or 
reduced lunch due to financial disabilities. Campuses were eligible to earn school-wide lump 
sum pay-outs based on student performance on the state math and reading exams, as well as 
school environment measures such as safety and student attendance.  For schools who received 
the performance bonuses, a campus committee comprised of four staff members determined how 
the performance pay would be distributed to the staff.  When compared to the control schools, or 
those who did not participate in the performance pay program, the 158 schools who did 
participate did not make significantly higher gains in student achievement (Goodman & Turner, 
2011).  Based on their analysis, “on average, students in these groups fared just as well whether 
they attended a school that was participating in the bonus program or one in the control group” 
(Goodman & Turner, 2011, p. 70).  
 Further discussion on the study leads the authors to believe that the structure of the 
performance pay system in New York is the problem, citing the whole-school payout lacks the 
monetary strength to motivate teachers.  The statement is made that “some teachers may 
conclude that exerting additional effort will produce little difference in the overall performance 
of the school” (Goodman & Turner, 2011, p. 71).  The findings suggest that whole-school 
performance pay has a stronger impact on campuses with smaller student populations, because 
the payouts are larger for teachers and they are able to work more collaboratively due to size.  In 
schools with larger populations, whole-school bonuses based on student performance do not 
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motivate teachers or impact student achievement because the overall payout is smaller and the 
environment is too large for tight teacher collaboration (Goodman & Turner, 2011).  
REACH Performance Pay Program.  Recently, Balch and Springer (2015) analyzed 
Austin Independent School District’s (AISD) REACH teacher incentive pay program, which 
compensated teachers based on value-added performance tied to student test scores.  Initially 
started in the 2007-2008 school year as the Strategic Compensation Initiatives, then renamed 
REACH the following year, the program awarded variable pay to teachers based student 
achievement, professional development, and recruitment and retention.  The focus of this study 
was to evaluate the relationship between student learning objectives and value-added 
performance with the purpose to identify best practices in measuring teacher effectiveness, 
which is ultimately tied to performance pay (Balch & Springer, 2015). 
  The research focused on how REACH impacted student achievement over its first two 
years and how student learning objectives, set collaboratively with the campus principal, 
connected to teacher value-added performance.  The findings from the study reveal gains in 
student test scores in the first year of implementation of REACH but mostly stagnant results in 
the second year.  However, the REACH schools did out-perform non-REACH schools in regard 
to student achievement on state standardized assessments.  It was also revealed that no 
relationship exists between the number of student learning objectives met by teachers and their 
effectiveness as determined by value-added test scores (Balch & Springer, 2015).  This leads to a 
possible contradiction between performance pay for mastery of campus-based student learning 
objectives and student achievement on state standardized assessments.   
Teacher Attrition  
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From an organizational perspective, teacher turnover results in staffing shortages and 
inadequate school performance.  The majority of research on teacher attrition examines 
individual characteristics of teachers rather than the character and conditions of the organizations 
in which teachers work.  Ingersoll (2001) investigated the role that teacher turnover plays in 
staffing shortages at schools as well as the teacher turnover rate at different types of schools.   
The study revealed that staffing problems vary greatly among different types of schools within 
the same jurisdiction, even though schools are drawing from the same supply pool of candidates.   
In some instances, schools within the same metropolitan area have waiting lists of qualified 
candidates for their openings while other schools within the same proximity have difficulty 
recruiting and hiring qualified teachers for their open positions.    
Schools that report difficulties in filling their vacancies are the same schools that have 
above-average turnover rates.  These school-to-school differences are often due to high poverty 
rates of more than 50%, with teacher attrition 50% higher in the higher-poverty public schools 
than low-poverty public schools (Ingersoll, 2001).   Consequently, urban schools across the 
nation have a large portion of inexperienced and underqualified teachers (Darling-Hammond, 
2003).  For the teachers in urban, high-poverty public schools, turnover is most attributed to job 
dissatisfaction such as low salaries, student discipline problems, lack of support from 
administrators, and lack of student motivation (Ingersoll, 2001).   
High-Poverty and High-Minority School Attrition.  The attrition of teachers in high-
poverty and high-minority schools has been studied in several states including New York, Texas, 
Georgia, and North Carolina.  The results of the studies show similar trends in teacher decisions 
to leave schools with high concentrations of poor students and minority students.  In a study of 
New York schools, Lankford, Loeb, and Wykoff (2002) examined the variation in teacher 
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attributes across schools to identify schools that have the least qualified teachers and to 
determine how the distribution of teachers is impacted by attrition and transfer.  The results 
identified several factors that influence teacher attrition decisions including salaries and non-
pecuniary school characteristics such as student demographics (Lankford et al., 2002).  
Clotfelder, Ladd, and Vigdor (2010) also studied how salary and student demographics impact 
teacher attrition decision in North Carolina.   Studies in Texas (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004) 
and Georgia (Scafidi, Sjoquist, & Stinebrickner, 2007) extend the study of teacher attrition 
beyond student demographics to identify student achievement as a factor that influences teacher 
retention.   
Teachers systematically favor higher achieving, nonminority, non-low income students 
over high-poverty, low performing campuses with high concentrations of Hispanic and black 
students.  Schools serving large numbers of academically disadvantaged, black, or Hispanic 
students lose significantly more teachers to other districts and other professions than affluent or 
low-poverty schools with higher academic achievement (Hanushek et al., 2004). While student 
achievement and poverty influence teacher attrition, the racial composition of the school is the 
factor most consistently linked to teacher mobility.  According to Lankford et al. (2002), 
qualified teachers leave schools where the proportion of nonwhite students is at least 75% greater 
than the schools they are transferring to and transfer to schools where the portion of poor 
students is 50% less.  This is evident in the nine-year attrition rate in North Carolina, as effective 
teachers at campuses with at least 80% nonwhite populations have an attrition rate of over 80% 
(Clotfelter et al, 2010).  
Findings from the literature indicate that in New York State, 17% of nonwhite students 
have teachers who are not certified to teach, compared with 4% for white students.  Also, 28% of 
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teachers of poor students have teachers who failed the certification exam compared with 20% for 
non-poor students (Lankford et al., 2002).   Correlations between school achievement and 
teacher characteristics in New York schools were also evident as less qualified teachers were 
more likely to teach in low-performing urban schools.  In Texas, 20% of teachers in schools in 
the bottom achievement quartile leave their school each year compared to 15% of teachers in the 
top quartile (Hanushek et al., 2004).  Scafidi et al. (2007) provides evidence to support these 
findings by stating that teachers are more likely to leave their schools if the school is their first 
teaching job and has low test scores, high-poverty, and high proportions of minority students.  
This results in the lowest achieving students being more likely to have new and inexperienced 
teachers, adversely affecting academic achievement.  Lankford et al. (2002) also examined the 
turnover rate in large urban areas in New York and found it to be higher than suburban areas, as 
only 29% of teachers were in their same urban school five years after starting compared with 
43% in suburban schools.  These high exit rates impact the quality of instruction students are 
receiving in urban schools.   
When moving across districts, the salaries are between 4 and 15% higher and within the 
New York City region, teachers who transfer districts experience a salary increase of between 12 
and 22%.  In most cases, starting teacher salary is the same across districts in large metropolitan 
areas and does not take into account student demographics (Lankford et al., 2002).  Similar to 
New York, North Carolina faces the same trend of the higher the nonwhite population, the harder 
it is to staff the school with qualified teachers, but higher salaries make it easier to do so.  The 
required salary to hire a teacher with a majority nonwhite student population is suggested to be 
4.7% higher than a more white school.   However, Clotfelter et al. (2010) indicate that salary 
differentials are powerful in retaining teachers in their initial teaching positions but less powerful 
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in retaining strongly qualified teachers with high certification test scores, undergraduate degrees 
from quality universities, and three or more years of teaching experience.  For salary differentials 
to impact teacher retention decisions, the salary increase must be significantly higher, ranging 
from a 10% increase to a 58.3% increased depending on the percentage of nonwhite students 
(Clotfelter et al., 2010).  
More qualified teachers seize opportunities to leave difficult working conditions and 
move to more appealing environments.  Therefore, urban schools are systematically receiving 
less qualified teachers than their suburban counterparts which causes a disadvantage to urban 
students.  Lankford et al. (2002) concludes that policies that focus on the improvement of low-
achieving students but ignore the teacher labor market are unlikely to impact the disadvantaged 
poor, urban students. The greater the segregation of schools, particularly race segregation, the 
higher required salary differentials needed to retain effective teachers (Clotfelter et al., 2010).  
Discussion 
 Performance pay and incentive pay programs vary across the nation, but share the same 
goals of rewarding, recruiting and retaining effective teachers to increase student achievement. 
The review of literature surfaces the complexity and challenges of creating and implementing a 
performance-base pay system that accurately identifies and awards effective teachers and results 
in higher rates of teacher retention and improvement in student achievement.  The literature 
analysis reveals that performance pay does impact student achievement and teacher retention, 
although program design and payouts differ greatly, further impacting the results of each 
program.  While the actual measured impact on student achievement is relatively positive, there 
are limited studies that analyze just the impact of pay incentives on student achievement.  It 
appears that this is due to the variations in the performance pay structures.   
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 Also important is the effect of performance pay on teacher behaviors.  The literature 
indicates that teacher turnover is reduced when performance pay is awarded, but unintended 
consequences also occur such as lack of collaboration due to the competitive aspect of individual 
awards.  Those two findings seem to contradict each other.  Effective teachers are retained, yet 
they are not motivated for extra duties or collaboration.  Also contrasting is that performance pay 
retains effective teachers but decreases their motivation depending on the structure of the pay-
out.  Finally, it appears that novice and probationary teachers respond more positively to 
individual performance pay bonuses based on student achievement than do experienced teachers.  
Experienced teachers, on the other hand, tend to be impacted by retention bonuses.  
 Future policy implications suggest a need for a locally developed performance-based pay 
system that will meet the recruitment, retention, and student achievement needs of the specific 
district.  Research indicates that teacher behavior is changed by pay incentives, therefore, the key 
for policy development is determining which incentives have the most impact on retention of 
effective teachers.  With the evidence of new and probationary teachers being motivated by 
individual bonus pay tied to student achievement, and veteran teachers preferring a retention 
bonus, it is worth further investigation to determine how to structure a performance pay system 
that provides differentiated awards to retain both novice and veteran teachers.  However, the 
research on teacher attrition at campuses with large portions of minority and poor student 
narrows the focus for future studies.   
 The literature is not vigorous enough to prescribe how performance-based pay systems 
should be designed and implemented uniformly in order get the desired results of teacher 
retention and improved student achievement.  For policy development, it is clear that districts 
must have specific and intentional purposes for performance pay and then set student 
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performance goals that are objectively measureable.  The measurement instrument that 
determines effectiveness must be valid and reliable, and all measurement goals, results, and 
resources should be communicated clearly to teachers to ensure they are understood.  Without 
transparency and fairness, the performance pay system can lead to the unintended consequences 
that were discussed previously, like competitiveness and lack of motivation.  When these 
elements are in place, and effective teachers are awarded for student performance in a system 
they understand, identifying how these performance incentives influence their retention decisions 
should advise district policy.  The most notable gap that exists in studies involving performance-
based pay programs is how the elimination of such performance-based incentives influences 
effective teacher retention in schools that already face adversity in retaining teachers due to high- 
poverty rates, high-minority populations, and low academic achievement.   
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used to study how the elimination of performance pay 
influences teacher retention decisions at hard-to-staff schools was sense-making theory.  Sense-
making theory is “defined as behavior, both internal and external, which allows the individual to 
construct and design his/her movement through time and space” (Dervin, 1983, p. 3).  Sense-
making theory provided the framework for examining and understanding the teacher behaviors 
associated with performance-pay losses.   
One assumption of sense-making theory is that behaviors are responsive to changes 
within specific situations, therefore making behavioral decisions situationally and contextually 
bound (Dervin, 1983, p. 6).  The context of this research study was low-performing schools with 
high portions of poor and minority students, and pairing that with the situation of effective 
teachers losing performance pay in these schools, makes understanding how teachers’ behaviors 
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are influenced within this context and situation particularly important in facing the challenges of 
high rates of teacher attrition.   
As data was collected and analyzed, sense-making theory was applied to best explain 
how teacher retention behaviors are influenced by the elimination of a performance-based pay 
system.  Also applicable to this study is the concept of loss aversion, in which teacher pay 
incentives are framed in terms of losses rather than gains (Fryer et al., 2012).  Fryer et al. (2012) 
found that giving teachers lump sum payments at the beginning of the school year and then 
taking it away at the end of the school year if their students did not meet performance goals had a 
greater impact on teacher behavior and student achievement than did performance bonuses 
received at the end of the year that were linked to student performance.  While end-of-year 
performance pay is the type of compensation lost by teachers within this study, the concept of 
losing the payment they once received is loss aversion within this context.   Sense-making 
theory, coupled with the concept of loss aversion, provided an approach to this qualitative 
research study that allowed for a comprehensive look at the influence of performance-pay 
elimination on teacher retention decisions and student achievement.   
Conclusion  
 The extent to which teacher attrition decisions are influenced by school characteristics 
such as student demographics directly impacts policies for the retention of effective teachers in 
high-poverty and high-minority campuses.  The relationship between compensation and retention 
of teachers at such hard-to-staff schools, which are also academically low-performing, has been 
studied from the perspective of retention bonus influence, but there is no evidence as to how 
teachers respond to performance pay for student achievement at these campuses.  In instances 
where effective teachers are identified and awarded for student achievement at low-performing 
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schools with high portions of minority and poor students, the extent to which that performance 
pay directly influences their retention decisions has important policy implications for school 
leaders.    
 Teachers prefer to work in schools that are academically high performing and have low 
populations of poor and minority students.  As districts struggle to staff low-performing, high- 
poverty, and high-minority schools with effective teachers, performance-based pay programs 
other than simple retention bonuses are worthy of review for policy development. The extent to 
which performance-based pay influences the behaviors of effective teachers in academically 
challenged, high-poverty, high-minority schools directly influences teacher attrition and student 
achievement and should therefore inform policy decisions for teacher retention. Based on the 
available literature, further study was needed to determine the impact of the discontinuation of 
performance-based pay on teacher retention in hard-to-staff schools.  As a theoretical framework, 
sense-making theory provided the foundation for understanding how the elimination of 
performance pay influences teacher retention decision in these such schools.  Also, the concept 
of loss aversion provided an additional lens to explain how teachers make sense of losing 
performance pay they once received for student achievement.    
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 Epistemology.  For the purposes of this study, the epistemological stance of 
constructionism was used.   Crotty (1998) describes constructionism as the view that “meanings 
are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting” (p. 43).    
Crotty (1998) also explains that constructionism is a reality based on experience and brings 
together both objectivity and subjectivity; therefore, the subject and the object are always united.  
Based on this description, the reality constructed by teachers as they experience the elimination 
of performance pay is seen as a phenomenon based on the interaction between “subject and 
object” (Crotty, 1998, p. 45).   Crotty (1998) further explains that the relationship between the 
subject and object as they experience the world is how meaning is developed.   
 Theoretical Perspective.  The theoretical perspective used for the purposes of this study 
was interpretivism.  Complimentary to the epistemological stance of constructionism, the 
interpretivist framework “attempts to understand and explain human and social reality” (Crotty, 
1998, p. 66-67).  This approach also “looks for culturally derived and historically situated 
interpretations of the social life-world” (Crotty, 1998, p. 67).   Through this perspective, paired 
with the conceptual framework of sense-making theory, teachers’ perceptions of the elimination 
of performance pay within the context of high-minority, high-poverty schools can be best 
understood.   Sense-making theory focuses on how people construct sense based on connections 
between situations and information (Dervin, 1983), which has its foundation in constructionist 
reality and interpretivist perspective.   Teachers within this study have information and 
experience with losing performance pay, and understanding their information and experiences 
within the context of high-minority, high-poverty schools, provided a unique perspective on how 
these influence retention decisions.  
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 Methodology.  A qualitative phenomenology was used to better understand the influence 
of the elimination of performance pay on teacher retention decisions at high-poverty, high-
minority schools.  Qualitative studies are most appropriate when there is a problem or issue that 
needs to be explored and to better understand the contexts and situations in which the 
participants experience the problem or issue (Creswell, 2013).   Further, Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000) state that qualitative research designs allow for the researcher to “speak from within a 
distinctive interpretive community that configures, in its own special way, the multicultural, 
gendered components of the research act” (p. 18).   
  Phenomenological research calls into question what is taken for granted and assumed and 
instead calls for putting our meaning systems aside and opening ourselves to the phenomena that 
emerges (Crotty, 1998).   This type of study describes the common meaning for a group of 
individuals of their experiences of a concept or phenomena (Creswell, 2013).  A 
phenomenological study was appropriate since the intent of this research was to determine how 
teachers are influenced by the elimination of a performance pay system.  Consequently, this 
study sought to describe what the participants had in common as they experienced the 
phenomenon of losing performance pay.  The following research questions were used to guide 
the study: 
 For urban high-poverty, high-minority middle schools in Southeast Texas- 
1. To what extent does the elimination of performance pay influence teacher retention 
decisions? 
2. How do teachers perceive the influence of performance pay on student achievement? 
3. How do teachers make sense of their experience with performance pay? 
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 Creswell (2013) further describes two approaches to phenomenology which are 
hermeneutic phenomenology and empirical, transcendental, or psychological phenomenology.  
Hermeneutic phenomenology was used for the purposes of this study.   Hermeneutic 
phenomenology focuses on the lived experiences of the participants and the interpretations of 
those experiences.  In this phenomenological approach, the process is both descriptive and 
interpretive as the researcher makes “meaning of the lived experiences” (Creswell, 2013, p. 
1729).   Creswell (2013) recommends that data used for phenomenological studies be multiple 
in-depth interviews with the participants as well as additional sources such as observations and 
journals.  Following this recommendation, this study consisted of three interviews with the 
participants and reflective journaling was used to capture tone and body language.    
 Sampling Method.  Creswell (2013) recommends a narrow sampling strategy for 
phenomenological studies to ensure that all participants have experienced the same phenomenon 
being studied.  Criterion sampling is suggested as the most effective strategy for identifying 
participants who have all experienced the same phenomenon (Creswell, 2013).   The criterion 
used to identify teachers for this study were as follows: teachers within the Southeast Texas 
School District who received performance pay for at least the previous two school years, and 
teachers who are currently teaching at the identified high-poverty, high-minority middle schools 
eligible to receive performance pay for student achievement on the STAAR during the 2016-
2017 school year. 
 In order to identify the participants, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 performance pay data was 
gathered from the Southeast Texas School District’s accountability department.  There are 
currently twenty-one elementary schools and four middle schools that are participating in the 
final year of the performance pay program, all of which are high-poverty, high-minority 
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campuses.  The performance pay data from the school district allowed for identification of 
participants who met the previously stated criteria.  The middle schools with the highest 
concentration of teachers who meet the criteria were selected.  The geographic location of the 
schools did not impact the data collected, because all schools had the same criteria of at least 
75% economically disadvantaged students and at least a 50% minority student population.  
In order to maximize variation, teachers were selected from all grade levels and subjects 
that are currently eligible to receive performance pay.  The grade levels and subjects included 
sixth, seventh, and eighth grade reading and math, eighth grade science, and eighth grade social 
studies.  Participants in the study were identified as receiving a performance pay award payout 
for both the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years respectively.  Maximum variation sampling 
ensured that the findings were reflective of different perspectives (Creswell, 2013) of the 
participants’ experience with the phenomenon of losing performance pay. 
 Data collection.  Seidman (2013) recommends a three-interview series to allow “both the 
interviewer and the participant to explore the participant’s experience, place it in context, and 
reflect on its meaning” (p. 20).  As suggested by Seidman (2013), the three-interview series 
process was followed.  The first interview focused on the participants’ work history to 
understand their experiences as a teacher within all school environments and their past 
experiences within the context of high-poverty and high-minority schools.  The second interview 
focused on the participants’ present lived experiences with performance pay and high rates of 
student achievement within the context of their current school setting.  Finally, participants were 
interviewed a third time and the interview was designed to have participants reflect on the 
meaning of their experience with performance pay.  This addressed the “intellectual and 
emotional connections between the participants’ work and life” (Seidman, 2013, p. 22).   
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Data was collected using one-on-one, semi-structured interviews and ranged between 
thirty and forty-five minutes.  The semi-structured interview format allowed for flexibility in 
asking follow-up questions when more detail was needed to clearly describe the experiences of 
the participants.  An interview protocol was followed as a guide and further questions were asked 
based on participants’ responses.  All interviews were recorded using a digital recording device.  
Digital voice recordings allowed for downloading and storage to a computer device for later 
transcription and transfer to word processing programs and the subsequent data analysis program 
(Saldana, 2011).   
 Reflective journaling was also used as a means of data collection.  During the interviews, 
key words and phrases spoken by the participants, as well as laughs, pauses, and non-verbal 
signals, were written down and were later included in the reflective journal entries.  Saldana 
(2011) states that in qualitative studies, “the primary task is researcher reflection on the data to 
capture the essence and essentials of the experience that make it what it is” (p. 8).  Reflective 
journaling, paired with the interview transcripts allowed for a true description of both the verbal 
and non-verbal aspects of the interview (Seidman, 2013).  After reviewing the recordings and 
journals of the three interviews, follow-up interviews were conducted as needed for clarity and 
further elaboration on the descriptions of the participants’ experiences with the elimination of 
performance pay 
 Data Analysis.  The interviews with the participants were transcribed verbatim by the 
researcher.  By using this transcription program, interviews were transcribed into a Word 
document.  Seidman (2013) suggests that researchers who transcribe their own interviews come 
to know their data better.  Analysis of the initial participant interview transcriptions, paired with 
analysis of the reflective journals, led to the need for follow-up interviews on a few occasions.  
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The first step in analyzing the text from the interviews was to conduct a close read of the 
transcripts and bracket the passages that are of the most interest and aligned with the purpose of 
the study.  This reduction of interviews was the beginning of analysis and making meaning of the 
data (Seidman, 2013).  The following step was the interviews being analyzed using process 
coding, which identified words to capture actions (Saldana, 2011).  Creswell (2013) recommends 
developing a list of statements about how the participants are experiencing the phenomenon, 
extending the identified words to statements to better capture experiences.   
The initial codes from the interviews were classified into categories that reflected the 
emerging themes of experiences and perceptions of the teachers in regards to the elimination of 
performance pay.   The themes were then be placed into similar clusters to develop theoretical 
constructs to transform the “phenomenon’s themes into broader applications” (Saldana, 2011, p. 
109).  Following the process described by Saldana (2011), a descriptive analysis followed with a 
written description of what and how the participants experienced the phenomenon, resulting in a 
textural and structural description of their experiences.  
 Saldana (2011) also recommends that any field note writing, which will inform the 
reflective journals, also be analyzed and coded using the categories identified through the 
analysis of the interviews.  The purpose of analyzing the reflective journals is an “open reflection 
on the phenomena and processes suggested by the data and their analysis thus far” (Saldana, 
2011, p. 98).  In this study, the reflective journals were coded using the categories that emerged 
from the interview transcription analysis.   Each of the three interview sessions, along with the 
analysis of field notes and reflective journals, were transcribed and analyzed within a three-week 
window after each component of the three-interview series.   
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 The final stage of data analysis and interpretation was identifying and explaining what 
meaning was made by myself throughout the data collection and analysis process.   In reflecting 
on my experience with the research, the questions of how I made sense of it, how I understood it, 
and what connections were made allowed for proposing “connections among events, structures, 
roles, and social forces operating in people’s lives” (Seidman, 2013, p. 131).   
 Strength of Methods.  The focus of a phenomenological study was on understanding the 
experiences of individuals around a phenomenon.  The researcher analyzed the data collected 
through in-depth interviews to develop a description of the common experiences with the 
phenomenon (Creswell, 2013).   This research study was focused on how teachers’ experiences 
with the elimination of performance pay influences their retention decisions, therefore making a 
phenomenological methodology the most appropriate.  A strength of this methodology was in the 
selection of the participants, as they are selected based on having experienced the same 
phenomenon.  In this study, all of the participants received performance pay for at least the 
previous two schools years and will no longer be eligible to receive the compensation for student 
achievement following the 2017-2018 school year.  Further strengthening the methods was the 
shared experience with the phenomenon within the same context of high-poverty, high-minority 
schools.   
 The data collection method of in-depth, individual, semi-structured interviews, paired 
with reflective journaling, were an additional strong point in methods.  Such methods allowed for 
deep analysis of the participants’ experiences and also allowed for follow-up questioning when 
needed.  Using a semi-structured interview protocol provided an opportunity for probing when 
more detail or clarity was needed to better understand the experiences of the participants.   
38 
 
Finally, verbatim interview transcription ensured that all information provided by the participants 
was accurately recorded for analysis.  
 Limitations of Methods.   Interviews can be difficult when participants are shy or are 
hesitant to speak and share experiences openly (Creswell, 2013).   In this study, rapport could 
have influenced the participants’ responses and their ability to openly share their experiences.  
Because there was no previous relationship with the participants, establishing rapport with the 
participants prior to conducting the interviews was critical to ensuring authentic responses.   
 Creswell (2013) discusses the importance of recognizing and acknowledging the unequal 
power dynamic that will exist between the participants and me, which will establish the rapport 
necessary for open dialogue and expression.   The unequal power dynamic in this study was my 
role as a principal compared to their roles as teachers.  The perception of power and possible 
relationships with the participants’ principals could have influenced their responses, as they may 
have felt that they should provide a safe response rather than detailed responses about the 
experiences and retention decisions.  This was where the establishment of rapport was most 
critical. 
 Trustworthiness and Quality.   The strategies used to promote trustworthiness included 
verbatim interview transcriptions and triangulation of data between the three-interview series and 
the reflective journals.  Verbatim interview transcriptions ensured that participants’ experiences 
were documented accurately and reflective journals provided further information about body 
language and the unspoken elements of the environment like tone.  These together allowed for 
theoretical constructs that existed from their experiences to emerge.   This “construct validation” 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 251) recognized the constructs that exist rather than imposing theories and 
constructs on the participants or the context.  
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Positionality. Creswell (2013) explains the needs for qualitative researchers to position 
themselves in their writings, which “is the concept of reflexivity in which the writer is conscious 
of the biases, values, and experiences that he or she brings to a qualitative research study” (p. 
222).   My position in regard to performance pay and its influence on teacher retention in high-
minority, high-poverty schools is unique in that I have been a teacher, assistant principal, and 
principal within the same performance pay system as that of the participants.   My role as 
principal has given me the most perspective on the influence of the performance pay system on 
both teacher retention and student achievement, mostly through the observations of and 
interactions with the teachers on my campus.  My experience biases me against ending 
compensation programs in urban school districts with large numbers of schools that are hard-to-
staff due to poor academic performance and large portions of poor and minority students.   
Also, I served on the committees that first determined who would be awarded 
performance pay and what categories eligible employees would be assigned to when the 
performance pay program was redesigned in 2007.  Later, I served on the committee to 
determine the instrument for measuring teacher effectiveness after the contract ended with the 
organization whose instrument utilized value-added measurements of student progress.  Both of 
these committees provided me with a perspective that is influenced by understanding the current 
system in regard to its strengths and weaknesses, but nonetheless knowing the complexity of the 
system and its difficulty for teachers to understand.   
  My position as principal during the study not only allowed me to have first-hand 
experience with the performance pay program, but to engage in conversations with teachers and 
administrators about the program structures for payout and teacher effectiveness.  It was 
important that I acknowledged my contextual experience and knowledge so that I could remain 
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open to understanding the teachers’ experiences with the performance pay program without my 
own biases influencing the questioning.   
 Ethical Considerations.   The most important ethical issue that that had to be addressed 
in this study was anonymity.  Due to the nature of the study focusing on teachers’ decisions to 
stay at their current school, the participants identity was protected throughout data collection, 
analysis, and reporting by the use of pseudonyms.  Therefore, no documents have identifiable 
information about the participants.  This was communicated to the participants to ensure that 
they were aware of the fact that their identity will remain confidential and felt comfortable 
sharing their experiences without the risk of their current principal knowing of their statements. 
Participants received no benefits or rewards for participation, and their participation was 
voluntary.  Also, given my positionality as principal and former committee member, it was 
important that I was aware of my potential for bias and intentionally excluded it in the data 
collection and analysis processes.  To avoid the perception of deception, my role as principal was 
explained to the participants.  Finally, all protocols of the Institutional Review Board were 
adhered to all times during the study.  
 Significance.  Teacher attrition at high-poverty, high-minority schools has an impact on 
the quality of instruction that students receive.  These hard-to-staff schools are, therefore, 
academically low-performing and continue to struggle with recruiting and retaining effective 
teachers.  This research study was needed to inform district policy on performance pay system 
design and implementation.   The literature indicates that teacher turnover is reduced when 
performance pay is awarded although variations in program design and payout structures 
influence retention differently.  Future policy implications suggest a need for a locally developed 
performance pay system that will meet the recruitment, retention, and student achievement needs 
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of the specific district.  Research indicates that teacher behavior is changed by pay incentives, so 
the key for policy development is determining which incentives have the most impact on 
retention of effective teachers.   
 In most cases, performance-based pay systems eventually disband due to loss of funding, 
which is the case for the Southeast Texas School District.  In the last year of funding from the 
Teacher Incentive Fund grant program, teachers within the group of identified schools will no 
longer receive funds for student achievement, which is the intent of the performance pay.  These 
schools were identified for the performance pay grant due to having high portions of students in 
poverty as well as poor academic performance.   
This study was necessary to determine the possible impact of the elimination of 
performance pay on the teacher attrition at these schools.   It is important to develop an 
understanding of how performance pay influences teachers’ retention decisions at hard-to-staff 
schools to inform policy development for retention and to determine alternatives to the grant-
funded performance pay programs that will influence retention.  Further, it is important to fully 
understand how teachers perceive the influence of performance pay on student achievement.  
Results of the study will advise policy development on current performance pay systems and 
future performance pay systems by understanding the impact of discontinuation at high-poverty, 
high-minority schools.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
 
 The purpose of this study was to determine how effective teachers make sense of 
performance pay through their experiences with the elimination of an established performance-
based pay system, and how these experiences influence teachers’ retention decisions in 
academically low-performing schools with high portions of economically disadvantaged and 
minority students.  Specifically, this phenomenological study presents the lived experiences of 
urban middle school teachers who were recipients of performance pay for consecutive school 
years in a now-eliminated system.  Their experiences were studied through the following 
questions:  
For urban high-poverty, high-minority middle schools in Southeast Texas- 
1. To what extent does the elimination of performance pay influence teacher retention 
decisions? 
2. How do teachers perceive the influence of performance pay on student achievement? 
3. How do teachers make sense of their experience with performance pay? 
 Chapter three described the methods and procedures to identify the influence of the 
elimination of performance pay on teacher retention decisions and student performance at high-
poverty, high-minority schools.  Chapter four presents the findings that evolved through analysis 
of the collected data.  This qualitative phenomenological study used a series of three face-to face 
semi-structured interviews, field notes, and reflective journaling to determine the findings.  Prior 
to presenting the findings of this study, the nine participants will be described, all of which 
served as middle school teachers within the Southeast Texas Independent School District.  To 
protect the anonymity of the participants, pseudonyms are used for the participants and the 
school district.   
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Description of Participants 
The nine participants in the study all served as middle school teachers within the 
Southeast Texas Independent School District.  Each of the schools in which the teachers taught 
were both high-poverty and high-minority campuses that served student populations of at least 
75% poverty and 50% minority.  Of the nine participants, five were female and four were male 
with years of teaching experience ranging from three years to twelve years.  Each of the 
participants received performance pay for at least the past two consecutive years due to student 
performance in the core subjects taught. The participant group consisted of three English 
Language Arts teachers, three Social Studies teachers, two Math teachers, and one Science 
teacher.  The following is a brief description of each participant as well as a table summarizing 
his or her teaching experience and years of experience with performance pay.  Pseudonyms are 
used for each participant to ensure anonymity and trustworthiness.  
Katie is a seventh grade Reading teacher who has been a teacher for four years.  All four 
of her years of experience have been at the same school, subject, and grade level within the 
Southeast Texas Independent School District.  She served as the English Language Arts 
Department Chair and was named the 2017 Teacher of the Year for her campus.  She received 
the maximum amount of performance pay possible each school year.   
 A sixth grade Math teacher and Math Department Chair, Wendy, has been at her current 
school within Southeast Texas Independent School District for three years.  Prior to that position, 
she spent five years as a high school Science teacher in a neighboring district, serving all five 
years in an alternative school that was also high-poverty and high-minority.  Performance pay 
was awarded to her the past two school years. 
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 James also serves as a 6th grade Math teacher and has been in his current position and 
school for two years.  He previously taught 6th grade Math at another middle school in the same 
district for four years before transferring to the current school due to proximity to home.  He has 
a total of eight years of experience, all teaching Math, with one year in a neighboring school 
district.  Also, his teaching experience has all been in high-poverty and high-minority schools, 
and he received performance pay for six years. 
 Jenny just completed her eighth year as a teacher, with six at her school and all in 6th 
grade English Language Arts.  Prior to teaching in the Southeast Texas Independent School 
District, she taught high school English in a neighboring school district in a school that was also 
high-poverty and high-minority. She received the maximum amount of performance pay every 
year she has been in her current position.   
 The only Science teacher in the group of participants, Greg, has been a teacher for four 
years.  He has been in his current position and school for one year, teaching 8th grade Science.  
The previous three years were served in two other middle schools within the Southeast Texas 
Independent School District and all were Science positions.  Both previous schools were also 
high-poverty and high-minority schools, and he received performance pay for two years.   
 Justine has four years of teaching experience, all at the same campus and all in 6th grade 
English Language Arts.  She has one year of student teaching experience in a neighboring 
district.  She received performance pay every year except one, which was due to her attendance 
and not student performance.  Each time she was awarded performance pay, it was the maximum 
amount possible.   
 A former teaching assistant, Derek has four years of teaching experience.  Each of his 
years of teaching experience have been at the same campus teaching 8th grade Social Studies.  He 
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also served as a special education teaching assistant at the same campus for one year prior to 
beginning his teacher career.  He received performance pay each year and was awarded the 
maximum amount each time. 
 As a Teach for America fellow, Stacy has been at her current school for three years.  She 
serves as the Social Studies Department Chair and teaches 8th grade Social Studies.  She also 
serves as the new teacher liaison and is tasked with supporting them in their new roles.  Stacy 
received performance pay the past two years, missing out her first year due to low student 
performance.  
 Devin is a twelve-year veteran teacher and teaches 8th grade Social Studies.  All twelve 
years have been at the same school, with the first ten years in 7th grade Social Studies.  He was 
awarded as the Teacher of Year for his campus in 2015 and serves as the Social Studies 
Department Chair.  He received the maximum amount of performance pay since the program 
was established in 2007.  
Table 1  
 
Participant Description Summary  
 
Pseudonym Subject Area Years of 
Teaching 
Experience 
Years of Experience 
with Performance 
Pay 
Maximum Amount 
Received 
Katie ELAR 4 4 $10,000 
Wendy Math 8 2 $7,500 
James Math 8 6 $12,000 
Jenny ELAR 8 6 $10,000 
Greg Science 4 2 $3,200 
Justine ELAR 4 3 $10,000 
Derek Social Studies 4 4 $10,000 
Stacy Social Studies 3 2 $8,500 
Devin Social Studies 12 10 $12,000 
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Emergent Themes 
 
Data collected through the three-series interview process provided a rich description of 
the participants’ lived experiences with the phenomena of the elimination of performance pay.  
Interview transcripts, reflective journals, and field notes were analyzed first through the 
reduction process to identify meaningful statements and reflections aligned to the study.  
Through process coding, the excerpts were then analyzed to identity frequent and relevant words 
and actions that resulted in initial codes and categories.  The code response frequency is 
presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 
 
Participant Code Response Frequency 
 
                                             Participants   
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9     
                      totals   
Codes 
Appreciation 9 0 2 8 6 2 5 1 10 43   
Under-Compensation 3 8 5 5 4 1 1 0 3 29   
Monetary Incentives 11 5 11 14 8 3 5 4 4 54   
School Culture 3 3 10 1 10 0 1 2 6 36   
Self-Motivation 13 6 7 5 6 6 5 2 8 58   
Self-Efficacy 10 5 6 5 5 9 5 2 5 52   
Test Accountability 3 5 4 5 5 4 12 13 7 58   
               
  Participant Pseudonym Coding for Table 2          
  
1-Katie  2-Wendy  3-James  4-Jenny  5-Greg  6- Justine 7- Derek 8-Stacy  
9- Devin    
                          
 
Emergent themes were developed during the coding process.  The three themes that 
evolved through the data relating to how teachers make sense of their experiences with the 
phenomenon of the elimination of performance pay were the influence of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation, teaching to the test, and the sense of self-efficacy.  For the purpose of this research 
study, intrinsic motivation refers to a teacher’s decision to provide effective instruction because 
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they find it enjoyable and find satisfaction in doing so (Gange & Deci, 2005) and extrinsic 
motivation refers to monetary awards for job performance.  Teaching to the test refers to teachers 
directing their instructional practices toward a specific body of content knowledge or a specific 
set of cognitive skills in order to raise their students’ performance on the STAAR (Popham, 
2001).  Self-efficacy refers to a teacher’s beliefs in their own capabilities to organize and execute 
the task of teaching (Bandura, 1989).  
The first theme, the influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, incorporates the 
significance that teachers place on monetary incentives as it relates to their decision to perform 
their jobs effectively.  The core of this theme relates to how teachers experienced performance 
pay as a motivator for improved student academic performance, and how the experience with the 
elimination of performance pay influences retention decisions for themselves and their 
colleagues.  Value is placed on performance pay as an award for student growth.  Participants 
express appreciation for receiving the award while also knowing that a monetary award was a 
possibility every school year.  Participants express that while performance pay was appreciated, 
it was only one motivator for job effectiveness, with the second motivator being their self-
motivation.  Teachers suggest that the elimination of performance pay will impact the retention 
of those teachers who are significantly motivated by monetary incentives.   
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Figure 1. Theme 1 Participant Word Frequency Cloud 
 
The second theme, teaching to the test, demonstrates what participants believe to be the 
behavior of many teachers as a result of performance pay.  The core of this theme describes how 
teachers understand the possibility of performance pay to influence instructional practices. 
Participants acknowledge the importance of teaching the state standards and believe that many 
teachers focus solely on mastery of the standards in order to earn performance pay.  Teachers 
suggest that the elimination of performance pay will result in less standards-based instruction.   
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Figure 2. Theme 2 Participant Word Frequency Cloud 
 
The third theme, the sense of self-efficacy, describes teacher perceptions of his or her 
effectiveness as experienced through the interactions with performance pay.  The influence of the 
participant interactions with performance pay as it relates to his or her own sense of effectiveness 
is the core of this theme.  Participants value the performance pay they received for being 
identified as effective teachers and feel appreciated as a result.  Teachers believe that they are 
effective without the performance pay incentive and that performance pay served a means for 
their hard work to be acknowledged.   
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Figure 3. Theme 3 Participant Word Frequency Cloud 
 
Theme One: Influence of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation   
All participants described value in the performance pay system as motivator for job 
performance.  Emphasis was also placed on the value of self-motivation for effective teaching 
practices, which participants believed to motivate themselves and their colleagues differently.  
Through shared experiences with the receipt and elimination of performance pay along with 
interactions with and observations of their colleagues with the same experiences, the influence of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation emerged as a major theme regarding teachers’ perceptions of 
retention decisions and student performance.   
Motivation and teacher retention.  When discussing the influence of the elimination of 
performance pay on teacher retention decisions at high-poverty and high-minority schools, 
participants all believed that it will mostly influence teachers motivated by monetary incentives. 
Katie stated that:  
I think it was a good motivator. So when you are awarded by the district by them seeing 
that you are actually making a difference with student achievement and student growth, 
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then being awarded that was a really good incentive.  But with it being gone, those 
teachers are probably just going to go to higher paying districts versus struggling in this 
district when they could be getting paid two or three thousand dollars more just fifteen 
extra minutes away.  
James echoed the same belief on the influence of monetary incentives on teachers’ retention 
decisions: 
I don’t think a lot of teachers have that deep-down desire or a self-drive.  I just think that 
some of them need some incentive.  I think it just has to do with drive and commitment.  
I think most of them stayed around because of incentives.  Since it is not there anymore, I 
think they will leave to either go to some other district that pays more or just find another 
career. 
Greg further explained how the elimination of performance pay will impact colleagues in their 
teaching practices and retention decisions: 
I just feel like it exposes more people.  Just the ones that are teaching for the money.  
You may lose some of those people.  Also challenging is now you may have to be self-
motivated, so that’s going to get a lot of people. 
Also supporting the belief that many teachers’ practices and retention decisions are motivated by 
monetary awards, Stacy stated: 
It takes more than just turning on the lights and giving them a lesson. Some people 
believe that they should be rewarded financially for that, which is fine.  So for them, if 
they are not going to receive that money, it’s a disincentive to stay.  Ultimately you will 
see less motivation, more teacher absenteeism, teachers leaving tougher schools. 
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Wendy echoed the sentiments of the other participants by sharing her perception of the 
challenges that the district will face as a consequence of eliminating performance pay: 
Being able to hire and retain good teachers that were dependent on the bonus.  Compared 
to other districts, if that is a thing where money is a factor, teachers will look to other 
districts because of the program going away.  
Motivation and instructional practices.  Participants also discussed how instructional 
practices will be impacted by the elimination of performance pay.  Through their informal 
observations and interactions with colleagues, as well as reflecting on the own practices, 
participants believe that those teachers motivated by monetary incentives will make changes to 
their instructional practices.  Jenny provided insight it to how teachers’ behavior will change 
regarding instruction: 
I don’t think they are going to put as much as effort as they were before.  Because I know 
there are teachers who will stay with kids after school for hours or will come before 
school, or pull them out of class, actually making that effort to make sure the kids get it.  
I don’t think we will see a lot of that anymore with that performance pay gone.  Because 
now it’s like why? 
Devin echoed the same sentiments by sharing his perception of the lack of extra effort that will 
result as a consequence of eliminating the monetary incentive: 
 I don’t know if teachers will really have the drive to get them into tutorials or that nature. 
 
James also shared the same belief in regard to effort: 
 
If they have kids that drive them insane, I just don’t think they will have the drive to push 
this kid because they know their pay isn’t depending on it. I think they will probably take 
a few steps back commitment wise. 
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Greg offered a variation of this perception by providing examples of the changes that are 
possible: 
I assume that maybe some teachers are going to take shortcuts and maybe not focus on 
things they should because they know they aren’t getting a bonus. But I assume that some 
teachers were so focused on the bonus that now they will resort to taking short cuts or not 
doing lesson plans. 
Katie provided further examples of perceived instructional changes and teacher behaviors 
connected to extrinsic motivation and how it will impact students: 
Those teachers who are not genuinely motivated to teach kids, I think they are going to 
get in there and just give the kids busy work, and they are going to teach at the kids rather 
than actually teach the kids.    I think that’s the most frightening part, especially being in 
a district that is low income.  I think it’s going to impact instructional practices along, 
along with the attendance, along with the initiative to want to grow professionally and 
develop professionally.  It’s all in a circle. You need all of those key factors in order to be 
a better teacher.  So, without that, or without being motivated, it’s going to affect the 
kids. I feel sorry I guess for the minority students who have teachers who are not 
motivated, you know, to genuinely teach them. 
Self-motivation and instructional practices. The majority of the participants discussed 
how their experiences with the receipt and elimination connected to their motivation to provide 
effective instruction to their students.  Some viewed the performance pay bonus as 
acknowledgement of their self-motivated hard work, and others viewed it as an incentive to 
improve the practices.  Wendy asserted that: 
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I kind of feel like if you are here for the right reasons, you want your kids to do well and 
succeed.  So regardless of how much you are getting paid, it should not affect how you 
teach. I go into each year with the mindset that I am going to do better than the year 
before.  Money doesn’t really impact anything for me in terms of bonuses or whatever.  I 
just feel like if you love what you do, and you are at a level where you want grow more, 
then you will do what’s necessary each year to make changes as you see fit. 
Like Wendy, Stacy focused on her own motivation and effort: 
 
I am going to give 100% regardless.  When I received it I was like, oh ok, my kids did 
well.   
Devin echoed the same sentiment when reflecting on how the performance pay bonus motivated 
him: 
I mean, I work hard regardless, I know that’s something that I do. And in my position 
sometimes you have to go the extra mile. For me, it didn’t matter, I was going to go the 
extra mile.  I’m going to have tutorials even when we don’t have a certain allotted day.   
I’m going to have tutorials regardless so that doesn’t affect that.  So for me I am going to 
be self-driven. 
Like Devin, Derek explained his experience with the performance pay bonus as a motivator: 
 
When I took the job I had no idea about ASPRE or bonus money, so I never pinned my 
hopes on it after the first year.  It was just a bonus.  No, the bonus never really even 
enters my mind. It’s more of a pride thing I guess.  I didn’t become a teacher because I 
was in it for the money, and maybe other teachers are in binds, I don’t know.  I think if 
some teachers are basing their decisions on whether or not they are going to get a bonus, I 
think maybe they are indifferent or apathetic to just helping kids out. 
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The possibility of the performance pay bonus motivated some of the participants such as Justine, 
who stated: 
It kind of made me push me a little more. I think it was because I needed my kids to grow 
so I could get money. 
Greg shared the same experience with performance pay as a motivator to give extra effort: 
 
Once I found out that I could get it, and how much money people were making, it 
definitely made me want to try harder. Not saying that I wasn’t trying hard before, but 
you know, when you are used to doing what you are comfortable with and then you 
realize that if you change certain things then you can get $5000. 
Jenny also pointed out examples of the extra effort exerted in order to receive the performance 
pay bonus: 
It gives you that incentive to make sure your kids are doing what they have to do.  It 
gives you a sense of I need to be here, I need to do this for these kids because you are 
getting that pay. Like I said, at the beginning it was $10,000.  Who wants to miss an extra 
day for $10,000? It’s just not worth it. I think it gave you that extra incentive of this kid 
needs to be in tutoring or spending that extra time with the kids who are struggling 
because you know you have something tied to it. 
James echoed the same sentiment: 
 
It’s a motivator.  It drives me to get the job done.  It definitely drives me to the students 
who the district predicts not do to well for to put most of my energy and practices into 
them.  I think that’s the most important thing because that’s where that money comes 
from.  
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Motivation and teacher attendance.  Another common thread that emerged within the 
theme of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation was that of teacher absenteeism.  The performance 
pay system required that teachers have no more than ten total absences during the instructional 
year in order to be eligible for performance pay.  Participants reflected on their own attendance 
practices and those of their colleagues, with many participants supporting the belief that teachers 
who are motivated by monetary incentives will increase the days that they are absent.  Wendy 
stated: 
The first year when I was here, it was like well I can’t take off that many days because 
with TPCAP you can only do zero to nine or you can’t go over ten.  Where as this year it 
was, uh, we aren’t getting TPCAP.  So second semester, after spring break, I feel like a 
lot of teachers were burned out, and so they just kind of really didn’t care if they were 
absent or not or how many days they had been absent.  
Jenny expressed the same perception in regard to an increased absentee rate for teachers who are 
motivated by performance pay: 
Before you would be on your dying bed, but you would be like, I can’t miss more than 10 
days.  I’ve got to be there.  Now it’s like, cough one time, and oh I can’t make it.  I don’t 
think attendance will be taken as seriously because there is nothing keeping you there.  I 
know those teachers who have days that rolled over, like that have 50 plus hours that they 
accumulated, they are going to start taking those days.  Especially if you have extra days 
accumulated.  Maybe not if you only have 10 days because more than that would start 
docking your pay. Then you are not going to miss.  But the teachers who have those 
additional days, I know teachers who have 40 plus hours, they are going to start using 
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those.  Because there is nothing keeping them, there is not TPCAP, so I might as well use 
those days and spend that extra time with my family.   
James shared a similar reflection: 
Definitely, it’s going to affect my attendance probably.  I mean I usually wait until April 
to start taking my days, but there are days when I pushed myself, and maybe I shouldn’t 
have.  I should’ve taken a day off, but because I knew I was so far away and that there 
was a big gap, I made the sacrifice.  But it will probably increase.  Not past attendance, 
but I will probably take more early days in the year. 
Further supporting the notion that teacher absenteeism will increase due to the elimination of 
performance pay, Greg stated: 
I do feel like it will affect attendance.  I don’t know the difference between state and 
local, but I guarantee you that teachers are going to be well versed on- I got state time 
and I got local time so I can do this.  So yeah, I definitely feel like it’s going to affect 
attendance.  
When asked about his understanding of the ten-day attendance requirement to be eligible for 
performance pay, Greg explained:  
I thought that was just to keep your job period.  So yeah, I heard something about ten 
days, but I thought it was just to keep your job period. So me, I was just always cautious 
like I can’t miss more than ten days.  But some teachers would need a day off a month.  
But I was just always conscience of the ten days, ten days, but I didn’t know it was for 
the pay.  
While not motivated by performance pay, Derek acknowledged the impact the its elimination 
may have on the attendance of his colleagues: 
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I assume it will, not for me personally, but other teachers who know they can take more 
than 10 days and that it won’t affect their bonus money, they will probably take more 
than 10 days.  
Devin identified the connection between performance pay, attendance, and school morale when 
reflecting on the attendance practices of teachers following the elimination of performance pay: 
I think it depends on the place. The morale, things of that nature, because if a place has 
low morale already, and people were getting performance pay, then yes.  You know I 
already knew that it was going to be eliminated next year, and I didn’t see if affected 
people that much.   Now after STAAR I see a lot of people take off [laughs]. But I think 
teachers know that they are still responsible for that.  But just like kids are kids, we are 
human, so we do need that peace of mind.  So I don’t know how much it will affect it.  I 
think it depends on the school.  In this district, I will say that it will affect it.  
The first theme, the influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, describes how 
teachers experienced performance pay as a motivator.  It established that teachers perceive 
monetary incentives as a motivator that influences teacher behaviors including attendance, 
instructional practices, and retention decisions.  Teachers equally recognize their self-motivation 
to provide effective instruction to meet the needs of their students.   
Theme Two: Teaching to the Test 
 
 A consistent thread in most of the participant interviews was the intertwining of 
instructional practices, alignment to the State of Texas Assessment of Academic Readiness 
(STAAR), and receipt of performance pay.  Through reflection on their own practices and 
informal observations and conversations with colleagues, the theme of teaching to the test 
emerged.   
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Instructional practices and performance pay.  Participants all emphasized the 
alignment between performance pay and mastery of the STAAR objectives. Participants 
discussed the prevalence of targeting specific students and objectives in order to earn the bonus. 
Stacy voiced her concerns about the link between performance pay and teaching practices: 
I think for teachers I have talked to, it is very significant.  They show up, they teach the 
TEKS, they differentiate for the purpose of getting money. Look, if it helps kids learn, 
then go for the gold.  That’s great.  But if it results in teaching to the test and neglecting 
all students, then please get rid of it by all means.  
She further described her perceived impact on instructional practices as a consequence of 
eliminating the performance pay program: 
Perhaps less teaching to the test.  So maybe more whole group instruction.  And it could 
cause more cavalier instruction, less targeted instruction because they know they won’t 
get awarded for teaching the TEKS. 
Katie supported the practice of aligning practices to attain STAAR mastery: 
 
Let me make sure that I am doing this so that this kid can pass or grow, paying extra 
attention to those kids who need to grow.  And doing the trainings and professional 
development needed to grow in order to keep the $10,000. 
Wendy also discussed teachers’ behaviors and instructional practices that ensure students master 
the STAAR and earn performance pay: 
It definitely motivates teachers to do better because the achievement is tied to what they 
will receive.  For STAAR testing and the attendance rate with the teachers will definitely 
make you want to be here, because if you are here, your kids are learning.  And you know 
that you are able to focus on the bubble kids or the kids that are low, the kids who you 
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know may skip because you are not here or whatever.  So, it holds you more accountable 
and the kids as well.  Some teachers look at the TEKS to see what will be tested and 
focus on that. I know this is going to be on the test, so let me do extra things whenever it 
comes to these TEKS, so they get it, and I can maximize the amount of money I receive.   
The practice of teaching to the test is discussed by Justine, who also emphasized how her 
instructional practices will change now that test mastery is not tied to a monetary bonus: 
More teachers not caring and not trying to get these kids from a low level to even maybe 
on grade level.  Now I will have the opportunity to where I don’t have to teach to the test, 
and where I don’t just have to focus on the low skills. I can focus on all of them, not just 
the low ones, and just go over them as needed.  I can have more creativity with lessons. 
But it is really important for them to be able to pass the test and really understand how 
their thinking goes.   
Prior to teaching 8th grade Social Studies, Devin taught 7th grade Texas History that was tested 
through the Stanford assessment.  He reflected on his initial receipt of performance pay and how 
it influenced his teaching practices: 
I realized it had something to do with our scores, our Stanford scores because in 7th grade 
that’s all I could rely on.  So probably about my third or fourth year is when we really 
started working on skills because with Stanford you don’t really know what is on the test.  
They gave us the objectives, so we knew what was going to be tested, and we used to 
hammer them.  We started teaching them skills, and we had to actually focus on subject 
matter with different types of economies and things of that nature.  But we focused on 
that and it paid off. 
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Derek openly discussed his focus on teaching to the STAAR although he stated he was not 
extrinsically motivated.  He also discussed his concern about student performance now that 
STAAR performance is not linked to performance pay: 
All that I am focused on, come March and April, I am in panic mode, trying to cover 
every TEK and every little topic that might be on the STAAR test.  It has nothing to do 
with the bonus; it’s the STAAR test.  I mean everyone is still taking the STAAR test; it’s 
not like the STAAR test is being eliminated.  So, I think maybe again, this idealistic kind 
of notion that let’s all get the kids to pass the STAAR test.  In my mind that’s how it 
works.  But I assume that some teachers were so focused on the bonus that now they will 
resort to taking short cuts or not doing lesson plans, not looking at the data or what have 
you.   So, I assume that maybe the scores might go down.  
Katie echoed that sentiment: 
 
I think that those achievement gaps that we’ve been working so hard to close, I think they 
are going to widen again.  Um, I feel sorry I guess for the minority students who have 
teachers who are not motivated, you know, to genuinely teach them.  Now those kids are 
going to suffer more because they are going to be further and further behind.  So, if you 
are struggling with analyzing theme, and you don’t get it, it’s going to more of- oh, you 
don’t get it.  And, if you don’t get it by now, you are not going to get it.  Versus, ok, let 
me see how I can spiral this back in.  You know, reflecting on your own feedback and 
instructional practices.  So, I think the kids are going to get more behind.   
Instructional practices and attendance.  With performance pay linked to teacher 
attendance, several participants discussed their perception of the impact of their attendance on 
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instructional delivery and mastery of the tested curriculum paired with how the loss of 
performance pay will influence teachers’ attendance behaviors.  Greg stated: 
I don’t want to miss because I’m like the test is coming up, and I got to make sure they 
get this.   If I’m not there they aren’t going to learn.  And everyone isn’t like that.  I’m 
not saying that’s a good way to be; that’s just how I am.  But if there’s no pay, and tests 
are the way they are, I can take a day off.    
Justine echoed the sentiments of Greg and further connected the elimination of performance pay 
to decreased student performance: 
I think that we will see a decline in their test scores.  Not my kids in particular, but in 
general as a whole. Because like I said, everything is like a domino effect.  When you 
take away the performance pay, the teachers are not going to show up, so therefore you 
have a sub in the classroom.  So students are not getting the quality instruction they need.  
So it’s like a spiraling effect, once you take that away, you will see a drop in the test 
scores.  
Jenny further supported this sentiment: 
 
I think with the classroom teacher not being there, I know me personally I do not trust a 
sub to deliver the lesson like I would deliver a lesson, so I would just rather leave 
something for them to do than leave actual work for the sub.  So, I think student 
performance will go down, because if the teachers aren’t there, they aren’t leaving real 
work they are leaving busy work for the kids to do at that point. 
Stacy, Derek, and Wendy placed value on receiving instruction from the teacher rather than a 
substitute, and how the increased absences will impact student learning.  Stacy stated: 
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Students will openly say that if there is a sub they don’t do anything.  So, if teachers are 
absent, learning is going to decrease.  
Derek supported that with a similar statement: 
I mean when teachers are absent, obviously, and this is not a slight to the subs, they are 
not going to be getting the same type of instruction they would get when the teachers are 
here.  That’s why I try to not miss, I know if I miss they are a day behind.  The stuff they 
are doing I have to go over with them again.  So, I know when teachers miss they are 
getting further and further behind.  
Also referring to the quality of instruction due to increased absenteeism, Wendy echoed: 
 
It will have a lot of effects, primarily because of substitutes and just kids knowing what 
they can and cannot do with the sub.  Plus, teachers giving busy work versus instruction 
just to keep them busy, and they are not really learning things on the days they are not 
here. 
With a more positive perspective, Devin explained that student learning depends on the quality 
of the teacher and not necessarily their increased absences: 
It depends on the teacher and what they leave and what they taught before and after.  If 
they are leaving and leave them just a whatever kind of assignment, no expectations.  Of 
course, the kids need us, but some kids will try harder than others.  But again, if the 
teachers do not leave good instructions for the sub, and they know they aren’t going to be 
there and don’t inform their students what they expect out of them.  Kids will still give 
less, but I’ve seen if you leave good expectations, you will see more work done.  So, it 
can affect it if the teacher is gone like 20 days and just being careless with their absences, 
then of course it will affect the kids, and then that’s going to affect their performance. 
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Theme two, teaching to the test, explained how teachers perceive performance 
pay as an influencer of instructional practices.  Teachers acknowledged the importance of 
effectively teaching students in order for them to successfully master the STAAR.  
Through reflection on their own practices and the practices of their colleagues, the 
teachers recognized the practices of teaching specific objectives and targeting students in 
order to earn performance pay.  Teachers also acknowledged the possible impact on 
student learning due to increased absenteeism.  
Theme Three: Sense of Self-efficacy   
 
All participants described some level of impact in their sense of self-efficacy from their 
experiences with performance pay.  The impact ranged from a feeling of appreciation for their 
effectiveness with student growth and achievement to self-realization that they were effective 
teachers.   
Self-efficacy and performance pay.  Participants repeatedly referred to how they felt 
about their own abilities after receiving a performance pay bonus.  Specifically, participants 
shared that they felt appreciated, vindicated, and recognized for doing their job well.  Jenny 
reflected on how performance pay affected her sense of self-efficacy: 
I think that it makes me personally feel like I am doing well at my job.  Because whether 
someone comes in and gives you an observation and they destroy you, whatever all the 
outside forces, when it comes to you, you are in the room with those kids, you know what 
they need, you are the one making sure they show growth, and when you see that nothing 
else that has happened outside of that matters at that point.  Because you know you have 
done your job.  And to know that you have done the best you can and to receive 
performance pay on top of that is just the icing on the cake.  I think because I received it 
65 
 
every year, it makes me feel like I am impacting these kids, and I am doing a good job.  
Because somedays you just have days where you think this just isn’t for me, it’s not 
working, not getting across to these kids, they don’t understand.  And then they will take 
a test and out of nowhere score well on it.   
Greg discussed his growth as a teacher, and how the receipt of performance pay influenced his 
perception of his effectiveness: 
It definitely made me feel better about it.  Like my first year I didn’t get it, I was 
struggling just trying to shadow and follow other teachers.  I just didn’t know. I had 
experience working with youth before, but I didn’t know how to teach and use all of the 
strategies, I was just me.  And after switching things up and trying to get better and 
adding this and adding that, it made me feel like I was on the right track and that I was 
getting better.  And now I don’t feel like I’m phenomenal, but I’m better than I was, and 
I’m steadily improving.  
Derek echoed the same sentiments: 
 
I think after my second year it was kind of like vindication because my first year I was 
relying on the experienced teacher.  But my second year, I was kind of on my own 
leading the way here.  So, after my second year, after I found out that I was receiving the 
full bonus, it was kind of like vindication that everything that I had done all year worked.  
So it made me feel good about the job I was doing, I guess.  I think I am a fairly good 
teacher, and I think that kind of helped confirm or affirm that I know what I am doing.  I 
am kind of new at doing this.  But it just proved that what I am doing in there is working 
I think. 
66 
 
For Katie, receipt of performance pay after her first year of teaching in a high-needs school 
created a sense of self-efficacy and sense of effectiveness: 
It did make me feel good.  You know, it made me feel good to receive that.  Especially 
my first year teaching, I received the maximum amount.   I was like dang, that was my 
first year.  It made me feel accomplished to say the least.  It made me feel like I 
accomplished my obstacles and challenges with teaching.  Especially in a diverse school.  
You know, since our school is a little more diverse than others.  It made me feel like, ok, 
you can teach this group of kids.  So it gave me a diversified perspective of teaching 
different levels of kids and not just the minority kids.  Like wow, these are the kids that a 
lot of teachers struggle to teach.  So, if I am getting this money for teaching these kids, 
then I appreciate that.  
Devin viewed his experience performance pay as a sign of recognition of and appreciation by the 
district for his effectiveness and extra effort: 
You have to understand that teachers can feel beat down and those kinds of things help 
them.  That’s a good pat on the back.  It’s not all about money because we could do 
something else, but to be able to be awarded for a job well done is good. I think it’s just 
rewarding teachers for students doing well.  Like for me I know I have done everything I 
can, and some kids just don’t come to school, and they didn’t pass.  So, you know it was 
frustrating, but performance pay was just another pat on the back.  It was a nice pat on the 
back to not only say that I’ve seen what you have done, we are rewarding the fact that 
your students did well, or they showed growth. 
For Justine, the experience with performance pay confirmed her sense of self-efficacy: 
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I feel like I’m a pretty great teacher, not to brag or anything.  I think it’s great because 
they get awarded for doing something they worked hard and are good at.  It’s always nice 
to hear from someone else and not just be boastful of yourself. 
Identification of effectiveness and performance pay.  All participants acknowledged 
their own self-efficacy when reflecting on their experiences with performance pay.  However, 
when reflecting on performance pay accurately identifying and awarding effective teachers, 
participants had mixed views on its validity.  Devin explained: 
I saw great correlation between teachers that I know were effective teachers and had great 
instructional practices, and they received it.  But I also saw situations where the teacher 
didn’t have any expectations of the child, just didn’t, and they would say that they 
received this performance pay.  But there were times where this teacher was working 
tirelessly and with good instructional practices, but they didn’t receive it, but this other 
person didn’t really do anything, and they received it.   
Greg’s view on its validity was similar to that of Devin: 
 
I just assumed that it was based on tested subjects, but just because you are not in a tested 
subject doesn’t necessarily mean that you aren’t effective.   I’m sure there are amazing 
dance teachers out there or even amazing PE coaches that don’t just chill and are actually 
teaching kids fundamentals of sports and stuff.  Just as far as being effective, I don’t 
know, there are so many teachers that are effective.  I feel like it was based more so on 
the campus that you were at versus your test scores and all that kind of stuff.  I don’t feel 
like it’s fair for a teacher who really is trying hard to not get paid because their school 
didn’t do well versus a teacher who isn’t necessarily working as hard, and who doesn’t 
have to do as much growing at another campus.  But their campus is on fire and doing 
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well.  So, I don’t think it did a great job of identifying effective teachers, but that doesn’t 
necessarily mean you get rid of the system, you fix it. 
Although the criteria for receiving performance pay was unclear, Katie still supported the system 
and recognized its awarding effective teachers on her campus: 
Based on some conversations that I have had with my colleagues, we would get 
performance pay, but in their particular grade level they didn’t get performance pay.  But 
then their percentage of passing rate would be really high.  So that part was kind of 
confusing, and we didn’t really understand that part of it.  That was just one encounter 
that I’ve had, but for the most part, the effective teachers on campus, they got 
performance pay. 
Derek echoed the same sentiment: 
 
I have heard teachers complain that it’s not fair, but we are all teaching the same stuff.   
And we all have, or some schools may have more impoverished kids, but we are all 
teaching the same thing.  And if you can teach it, you can teach it anywhere.  That’s kind 
of a pie in the sky kind of thing.  I never thought it was unfair.  If you can teach the 
material, you can teach the material. It’s a level playing field basically. 
Acknowledging her own effectiveness, Jenny explained her support of the performance pay 
system, and its accuracy in awarding effective teachers: 
I think I have a bias because I have been an effective teacher, so I think it works in my 
favor.  So, of course I am for it.  If my kids are showing growth, I don’t think it’s a 
problem with awarding a teacher for putting in that extra time and going the extra mile to 
make sure their kids succeed.  From the teachers that I know who received performance 
pay, I think it was accurate.  I don’t know all of the teachers in the district who received 
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it, but the ones I know personally, I do think they were good teachers.  I saw them work 
with their kids and go above and beyond for the kids, so I think it did identify teachers 
properly. 
Theme three, the sense of self-efficacy, described the value teachers placed on 
performance pay when reflecting on their own effectiveness.  Teachers explained how receiving 
performance pay acknowledged their hard work and effectiveness and also expressed a feeling of 
appreciation when they reflected on their experience with performance pay.   The teachers also 
described their perceptions of the performance pay system accurately identifying effective 
teachers. 
Summary 
 
 Chapter four explored the findings that describe how effective teachers experience and 
make sense of the elimination of a performance pay system.  Interviews with participants 
identified three themes relating to how teachers make sense of their experiences with the 
phenomenon of the elimination of performance pay.  The three emergent themes were the 
influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, teaching to the test, and the sense of self-efficacy.  
The narrative of the participants obtained through a series of three semi-structured interviews 
demonstrated the relationship between the experiences and supported the construction of the 
three themes.  Chapter five will discuss the findings from this chapter and will provide further 
implications and recommendations for district leaders in implementation and elimination of a 
performance pay system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMEDATIONS 
 Chapter five presents the findings, implications, and recommendations of this study.  This 
phenomenological study explored how teachers experienced the elimination of a long-established 
performance pay system.  Qualitative methods were used to better understand the influence of 
the elimination of performance pay on teacher retention decisions at high-poverty, high-minority 
schools, and those methods are described in Chapter three.  The three-interview series process, 
field notes, and reflective journaling produced the findings of this study.    This chapter begins 
with an overview of the study and is followed by the results to each of the research questions. 
The conclusions are organized by the major findings through the emergent themes: (a) the 
influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, (b) teaching to the test, and (c) the sense of self-
efficacy.  This chapter concludes with implications for school districts and recommendations for 
further research.   
Problem Statement 
 There is a need to identify how the elimination of a performance pay system influences 
effective teachers’ retention decisions at high-needs schools.  Performance pay influences 
teachers’ behaviors, and since teachers respond to incentives, careful consideration should be 
given when implementing and discontinuing performance-based pay programs (Jones, 2013).  
The current performance pay program in Southeast Texas School District awards teachers for 
student achievement in schools with historically low academic performance and high rates of 
economically disadvantaged students.  With student achievement as the primary goal of 
performance pay, an equally important issue that is not yet understood is how teachers perceive 
the influence of performance pay on student achievement.  
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The attrition of teachers in high-poverty, high-minority schools in Texas, Georgia, New 
York and North Carolina reflect the trend of teachers leaving schools with high concentrations of 
poor students and minority students.  Hanushek et al. (2004) explain that schools serving large 
numbers of academically disadvantaged, black, or Hispanic students lose significantly more 
teachers to other districts and other professions than affluent or low-poverty schools with higher 
academic achievement.  While economic status and academic performance influence teachers’ 
attrition decisions, Lankford et al. (2002) state that the student demographics of the school has an 
even stronger impact, as qualified teachers leave schools where the proportion of nonwhite 
students is at least 75% greater than the schools they are transferring to and transfer to schools 
where the portion of poor students is 50% less.   These attrition trends result in minority and 
economically disadvantaged students systematically having new and inexperienced teachers, thus 
adversely affecting academic achievement. 
With the intent of performance pay being to increase the quality of teachers to improve 
student academic achievement, prevent attrition, and retain teachers at high-needs campuses to 
prevent the trend of effective teachers moving to schools that serve relatively high-performing 
and economically sound students (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006), the desire for 
districts across the nation to establish a tighter link between teachers’ effectiveness in the 
classroom and their compensation influences current policy in public schools (DeAngelis & 
Dang, 2016).  While there is no one-size-fits all approach to performance-based pay design and 
implementation, and the measures used to determine teacher effectiveness vary greatly, the goal 
of such compensation plans is to award teachers for student achievement.  Careful design and 
implementation are critical to the success of any performance-based pay program, and “the 
incentive structure created needs not only promote teacher effectiveness but also be fiscally 
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feasible if the program is to be sustained” (DeAngelis & Dang, 2016, p. 16).  Therefore, 
discontinuing performance pay for teachers who have shown positive impacts on student 
achievement can have lasting implications within the context of high-needs schools.  
Purpose of the Study  
 The purpose of this study was to determine how effective teachers make sense of 
performance pay through their experiences with the elimination of an established performance-
based pay system, and how those experiences influence teachers’ retention decisions in 
academically low-performing schools with high portions of economically disadvantaged and 
minority students.   One goal of the study was to understand how teachers perceive performance 
pay influencing their decisions to remain in their current positions at high-poverty, high-minority 
schools.  A second goal of the study was to explain how teachers perceive student achievement 
to be influenced by performance pay.   
Methodology Overview 
 A qualitative phenomenology was used to better understand the influence of the 
elimination of performance pay on teacher retention decisions at high-poverty, high-minority 
schools.  Qualitative studies are most appropriate when there is a problem or issue that needs to 
be explored and to better understand the contexts and situations in which the participants 
experience the problem or issue (Creswell, 2013).   Further, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) state that 
qualitative research designs allow for the researcher to “speak from within a distinctive 
interpretive community that configures, in its own special way, the multicultural, gendered 
components of the research act” (p. 18).   The experiences of nine urban middle school teachers 
were collected, described, and analyzed through a series of three semi-structured interviews.  
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Each of the participants were middle school teachers in the Southeast Texas School District and 
received performance pay awards for at least two consecutive school years.   
 The semi-structured interview format allowed for flexibility in asking follow-up 
questions when more detail was needed to clearly describe the experiences of the participants.  
An interview protocol was followed as a guide, and further questions were asked based on 
participants’ responses.  The first interview focused on the participants’ work history to 
understand their experiences as a teacher within all school environments and their past 
experiences within the context of high-poverty and high-minority schools.  The second interview 
focused on the participants’ lived experiences with performance pay and high rates of student 
achievement within the context of their current school setting.  Finally, participants were 
interviewed a third time to have them reflect on the meaning of their experience with 
performance pay.  Due to the nature of the study focusing on teachers’ decisions to stay at their 
current school, the participants and school district identities were protected throughout data 
collection, analysis, and reporting by the use of pseudonyms.   
Data Analysis 
 The interviews with the participants were all transcribed verbatim into a Word document 
by the researcher.  Seidman (2013) suggests that researchers who transcribe their own interviews 
come to know their data better.  The first step in analyzing the text from the interviews was a 
close read of the transcripts and bracketing the passages that were of the most interest and 
aligned with the purpose of the study.  This reduction of interviews was the beginning of analysis 
and making meaning of the data (Seidman, 2013).  The following step in the analysis process 
was process coding, which identified words to capture actions (Saldana, 2011).  Creswell (2013) 
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recommends developing a list of statements about how the participants are experiencing the 
phenomenon, extending the identified words to statements to better capture experiences.   
The initial codes from the interviews were classified into categories that reflected the 
emerging themes of experiences and perceptions of the teachers in regard to the elimination of 
performance pay.   The themes were then to be placed into similar clusters to develop theoretical 
constructs to transform the “phenomenon’s themes into broader applications” (Saldana, 2011, p. 
109).  Following the process described by Saldana (2011), a descriptive analysis followed with a 
written description of what and how the participants experienced the phenomenon, resulting in a 
textural and structural description of their experiences. These two were then combined into a 
culminating representation of the experiences of the participants with the phenomenon of losing 
performance pay within the context of high-poverty, high-minority schools.  
 Data collected was kept in private and locked desks and computer files.  Also, no 
documents had identifiable information about the participants.  This was communicated to the 
participants to ensure that they aware of the fact that their identity would remain confidential and 
that they would feel comfortable sharing their experiences without the risk of their current 
principal or district leaders knowing of their statements.  
 Limitations of methods.  Interviews can be difficult when participants are shy or are 
hesitant to speak and share experiences openly (Creswell, 2013).   In this study, rapport could 
have influenced the participants’ responses and their ability to openly share their experiences.  
Because there was no previous relationship with the participants, establishing rapport with the 
participants prior to conducting the interviews was critical to ensuring authentic responses.   
 Creswell (2013) emphasized the importance of recognizing and acknowledging the 
unequal power dynamic that exists between the participants and researcher.  In doing so, an 
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effort was made to establish the rapport necessary for open dialogue and expression.   The 
unequal power dynamic in this study was my role as a principal compared to their roles as 
teachers.  The perception of power and possible relationships with the participants’ principals 
could have influenced their responses, as they may have felt they should provide a safe response 
rather than detailed responses about their experiences and retention decisions.    
Finally, the participant group is a small representation of teachers within the Southeast 
Texas School District.  The researcher was tasked with identifying possible participants from 
district performance pay documents from the previous two school years.  Due to attrition and 
timing of the data collection during the month of June when teachers are not required to be on 
duty, the participant group was limited to nine middle school teachers.   
Significance.  Teacher attrition at high-poverty and high-minority schools has an impact 
on the quality of instruction that students receive.  These hard-to-staff schools are, therefore, 
academically low-performing and continue to struggle with recruiting and retaining effective 
teachers.  This research study was needed to inform district policy on performance pay system 
design, implementation, and elimination.   The literature indicates that teacher turnover is 
reduced when performance pay is awarded although variations in program design and payout 
structures influence retention differently.  Future policy implications suggest a need for a locally 
developed performance pay system that will meet the recruitment, retention, and student 
achievement needs of the specific district.  Research indicates that teacher behavior is changed 
by pay incentives, so the key for policy development is determining which incentives have the 
most impact on retention of effective teachers.   
 In most cases, performance-based pay systems eventually disband due to loss of funding, 
which is the case for the Southeast Texas School District.  In the last year of funding from the 
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Teacher Incentive Fund grant program, teachers within the group of identified schools will no 
longer receive funds for increased student achievement, which is the intent of the performance 
pay program.  These schools were identified for the performance pay grant due to having high 
portions of students in poverty as well as historically poor academic performance.   
This study was necessary to determine the possible impact of the elimination of 
performance pay on the teacher attrition at schools within high-needs schools.   It is important to 
develop an understanding of how performance pay influences teachers’ retention decisions at 
hard-to-staff schools to inform policy development for retention and to determine alternatives to 
the grant-funded performance pay programs that will influence retention.  Further, it is important 
to fully understand how teachers perceive the influence of performance pay on student 
achievement.  Results of the study will advise policy development on current performance pay 
systems and future performance pay systems by understanding the impact of discontinuation at 
high-poverty, high-minority schools.  
Summary of Results of Research Questions 
  This qualitative phenomenological study used an interpretivist theoretical perspective 
and a constructionist epistemological stance to answer the research questions.   Through this 
perspective, paired with the conceptual framework of sense-making theory, teachers’ perceptions 
of the elimination of performance pay within the context of high-minority, high-poverty schools 
can be best understood.  Emergent themes were utilized to present the participants’ perceptions 
based on their lived experiences with the elimination of an established performance pay system.  
Themes were organized in a manner that answered each of the following research questions: 
 For urban high-poverty, high-minority middle schools in Southeast Texas- 
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1. To what extent does the elimination of performance pay influence teacher retention 
decisions? 
2. How do teachers perceive the influence of performance pay on student achievement? 
3. How do teachers make sense of their experience with performance pay? 
Theme of the influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on retention.  The 
influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation explains the significance that teachers place on 
monetary incentives as it relates to their decisions to perform their jobs effectively in high-needs 
schools.  The core of this theme relates to how teachers experienced performance pay as a 
motivator for improved student academic performance, and how the experience with the 
elimination of performance pay influences retention decisions for themselves and their 
colleagues.   
A major finding from this research study was the determination that teachers perceive 
performance pay as a motivator for retention at high-poverty and high-minority schools.  
Teachers suggested that the elimination of performance pay will impact the retention of those 
teachers who are significantly motivated by monetary incentives.  Teachers stated that many of 
their colleagues lacked self-drive and the commitment to effective job performance and student 
learning and that they remained at their current campuses due to the possibility of performance 
pay.  For those perceived to be motivated by monetary incentives, it was consistently 
communicated that retention by the district will be difficult.   
Although only one participant expressed that employment would be sought elsewhere 
due to the elimination of performance pay, all teachers valued the possibly of performance pay as 
a motivator for effective instructional practices and also valued it as an acknowledgment of their 
self-motivated commitment to student learning.  All of the participants discussed their self-
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motivation to ensure that their students mastered the learning objectives but also shared their 
experience with performance pay as a motivator for extra effort.  Examples of extra effort tied to 
performance pay included before and after school tutorials, regular attendance with limited days 
off, and differentiated activities based on learning needs.   
For retention purposes, the study illuminated the influence of compensation on those 
decisions.  Teachers believe that those extrinsically motivated teachers will move to districts that 
have higher or equal salary schedules.  The salaries in neighboring school districts were 
frequently referenced when discussing retention decisions.  Salaries were described as higher or 
equal to those of Southeast Texas School District.  Also referenced, were higher salaries for 
teachers with graduate degrees, which the Southeast Texas School District does not award 
compensation for.  Teachers explained that higher or equal pay in the neighboring districts would 
motivate teachers to seek employment there due to the perception of fewer minority and 
impoverished students, making their jobs less difficult as compared to their current positions.   
The culmination of the teachers’ experiences within this theme is the perceived influence 
of the elimination of performance pay on teacher retention decisions.  Ultimately, teachers 
perceive an increased attrition rate of effective teachers at high-poverty and high-minority 
schools.  Performance pay was not experienced by any teachers as a recruitment incentive, only a 
retention incentive, as only one participant had knowledge of the performance pay system prior 
to employment within the district.  Knowledge of the performance pay system was acquired 
through colleagues, and value was acquired through the experience of receiving it as a core 
academic teacher.  Through informal conversations with colleagues and observations of their 
behaviors, teachers perceive the influence of performance pay on retention decisions to be 
significant at high-needs schools and anticipate effective teachers to actively seek employment in 
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surrounding districts with either higher salary schedules or fewer minority and impoverished 
students.  Additionally, teachers perceived that increased compensation, not solely performance 
pay, would increase teacher retention.   
Theme of teaching to the test.    The second theme, teaching to the test, demonstrates 
what participants believe to be the behavior of many teachers as result of performance pay.  The 
core of this theme describes how teachers understand the possibility of performance pay to 
influence instructional practices. A consistent thread throughout the theme was the intertwining 
of instructional practices, alignment to the State of Texas Assessment of Academic Readiness 
(STAAR), and receipt of performance pay.   
A second major finding of this study was that teachers perceive that student achievement 
on standardized assessments will decline as a consequence of the elimination of the performance 
pay system.  Teachers all emphasized the alignment between performance pay and mastery of 
the STAAR objectives. Open discussion by all teachers revealed the prevalence of targeting 
specific students and objectives in order to earn the performance bonus.  Teachers explained 
their perceptions that their colleagues will provide less effective instruction without the incentive 
for performance pay.  Examples provided included more whole group instruction, less targeted 
small group instruction, and less focus on testing strategies and student growth.  Teachers also 
reflected on their own instructional practices and impact on student performance and admitted to 
changing their practices to be more creative, less aligned to the low-mastery standards, and less 
focused on the students’ prior STAAR performance for growth.   
With performance pay linked to teacher attendance, teachers discussed their perception of 
the impact of their attendance on instructional delivery and mastery of the tested curriculum 
paired with how the loss of performance pay will influence teachers’ attendance behaviors.  The 
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quality of instruction provided by the teachers was consistently referenced as the sole means for 
students to successfully master the state standards.   Teachers perceive teacher attendance rates 
to decline due to the elimination of performance pay and connect that to a decline in student 
achievement due to fewer quality instructional days provided to students. 
Ultimately, teachers perceive the elimination for performance pay to result in a decline in 
student achievement on the STAAR.  Although teachers recognize the mandate to teach the state 
curriculum, the autonomy to determine instructional practices aligned to the state standards 
contributes to their perceptions of change due to mastery no longer determining extra 
compensation.  Additionally, the recognition that student learning occurs when the actual teacher 
is present led to the conclusion that student learning will decline due to increased teacher 
absenteeism. 
Theme of sense of self-efficacy.  The third theme, the sense of self-efficacy, describes 
teacher perceptions of their effectiveness as experienced through the interactions with 
performance pay.  The influence of the teacher interactions with performance pay as it relates to 
their own sense of effectiveness is the core of this theme. All teachers described some level of 
impact on their sense of self-efficacy from their experiences with performance pay. 
A third major finding of this study is that teachers make sense of performance pay through 
their sense of self-efficacy.  Teachers repeatedly referred to how they felt about their own abilities 
after receiving a performance pay bonus.  Specifically, teachers shared that they felt appreciated, 
vindicated, and recognized for doing their job effectively.  Teachers explained that teaching 
students in high-needs schools present challenges with achievement gaps and require intentional 
differentiation and extra time and emotional energy to successfully lead students to mastery of the 
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state standards.  The receipt of performance pay contributed to their sense of effectiveness as well 
as their instructional growth.   
As much as teachers valued performance pay for their sense of self-efficacy, they had 
mixed views on performance pay accurately identifying and awarding effective teachers.  Based 
on their observations of STAAR data, teachers saw a disconnect between grade-level 
performance and the awarding of performance pay.  However, through conversations with 
colleagues and informal observations of instructional practices, teachers recognized a correlation 
between their perception of effectiveness and the awarding of performance pay.  Additionally, a 
lack of understanding of the metrics for earning performance pay was also acknowledged as 
contributing to the teachers’ perceptions of the validity of the system.  
For these teachers, sense was made of performance pay through their sense of self-
efficacy.  Teachers acknowledged that the receipt of performance pay contributed to their sense 
of feeling effective.  Being awarded performance pay strengthened teachers’ perceptions of the 
skills and commitment necessary for effectively teaching students in high-needs schools and 
contributed to the confidence in their ability to influence student learning.   
Implications and Recommendations for Practice 
 My study presented the experiences of middle school teachers in high-needs schools in a 
large urban school district in Southeast Texas.  The study is timely because “it is a known fact 
that most large urban districts and many isolated rural districts across the country have teacher 
shortages, have been forced to hire less-qualified teachers, and have difficulty competing in their 
markets for good teachers” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 397).   As a result, teacher turnover is high, 
which has an impact on student learning due to the lack of consistently effective instruction each 
school year.  Across the United States, approximately half a million teachers leave their schools 
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each year.  Only 16% of this teacher attrition at schools is due to retirement. The remaining 84% 
of the teacher turnover is due to teachers transferring between schools or leaving the profession 
entirely (Boyd et al., 2011).  In connection to my study, all nine teacher participants perceived 
performance pay to significantly influence teacher retention decisions and student performance.   
 School district leaders should create performance pay systems that have longevity in the 
funding source, have a plan for external funding such as grants, or a phase-out plan so that 
teachers have time to adjust to the lack of additional compensation.  As stated in the literature, 
many of the large-scale performance pay systems ended due to lack of funding, resulting in 
discontinuation of performance pay awards for teachers.  The performance pay system in the 
Southeast Texas School District is an example of a system that was established for ten years and 
was funded through both district funds and the federally funded Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) 
program grant.  With the reduction in state funds and the ending of the TIF grant, the district was 
forced to eliminate the program although data reflected that retention of core academic teachers 
increased under the program.  In districts with high-needs schools such as the Southeast Texas 
School District, leaders should examine effective compensation plans in similar school districts 
that result in high rates of teacher retention.  District leaders should also collaborate with campus 
leaders and teachers to determine what compensation structures will result in the highest rates of 
retention.   
 School district leaders should anticipate behaviors under the performance pay system to 
change following its elimination.  Teachers in my study openly communicated the anticipated 
changes in instructional practices for both themselves and their colleagues as a result of the 
elimination of the performance pay system.  Consequently, teachers who were awarded for 
student growth and achievement on standardized tests could change their instructional practices 
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to be less individualized and mastery-focused.  This could negatively impact student 
achievement on standardized assessments. District leaders should consider alternative awards for 
student achievement to ensure that instructional practices remain aligned to state standards and 
district expectations.  Collaborating with campus leaders and teachers to develop an alternative 
award system could result in a quality instructional incentive program that motivates teachers to 
improve student achievement.   
 Additionally, school district leaders should seek to create an incentive plan for teacher 
attendance.  This study revealed a connection between performance pay, teacher attendance, and 
student achievement.  When teachers are eligible for a performance pay bonus when meeting 
attendance requirements, their attendance and instructional time provided to students is 
maintained at high levels.  Without performance pay linked to teacher attendance, absenteeism 
could increase, leaving students with substitute teachers and ineffective instruction.  Leaders at 
the district level should collaborate with campus leaders and teachers to design an attendance 
incentive program to maximize teacher attendance and quality instructional time.   
Recommendations for Research 
 The literature reveals many studies on teacher attrition at high-needs schools and the 
impact of performance pay on teacher retention and student achievement in a diverse group of 
schools and districts.  Each of the performance pay systems studied were complex and were 
stand-alone programs that were locally developed, implemented, and eliminated.  Each 
performance pay system previously studied was examined based on effectiveness during 
implementation.  My study was unique in studying the influence of the elimination of an 
established performance pay system.  With many large-scale performance pay systems being 
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eliminated in recent years, the opportunity for studying the long-term impacts of their 
elimination exists. 
 Future studies of eliminated performance pay systems could include (a) attrition of 
awarded teachers at high-needs schools three to five years after the elimination, (b) student 
performance at high-needs schools three to five years after the elimination, (c) perceptions of 
teachers who remained at their campuses several years after the elimination, and (d) strategies 
used by school districts to retain teachers and increase student achievement following the 
elimination.  
Summary  
 This study was conducted to determine how effective teachers make sense of 
performance pay through their experiences with the elimination of an established performance-
based pay system, and how these experiences influence teachers’ retention decisions in 
academically low-performing schools with high portions of economically disadvantaged and 
minority students.   One goal of the study was to understand how teachers perceive performance 
pay influencing their decisions to remain in their current positions at high-poverty, high-minority 
schools.  A second goal of the study was to explain how teachers perceive student achievement 
to be influenced by performance pay.  Teachers were specially chosen through historical district 
performance documents to ensure that all teachers had experience with the elimination of 
performance pay after receiving it for at least the last two consecutive school years.  Interviews, 
reflective journals, and field notes were all analyzed to develop three emergent themes.   
 The theme of the influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation focused on the 
significance that teachers placed on monetary incentives as it relates to their decision to perform 
their jobs effectively.  The core of this theme related to how teachers experienced performance 
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pay as a motivator for improved student academic performance and how the experience with the 
elimination of performance pay influences retention decisions for themselves and their 
colleagues.  Findings through this theme propose that the elimination of performance pay will 
negatively impact the retention of those teachers who are significantly motivated by monetary 
incentives.  This suggests that district leaders should examine performance pay systems for 
longevity in the funding source, have a plan for external funding such as grants, or create a 
phase-out plan so that teachers have time to adjust to the lack of additional compensation.  An 
additional recommendation is that leaders collaborate with campus leaders and teachers to 
determine what compensation structures will result in the highest rates of retention.   
The theme of teaching to the test demonstrates what participants believe to be the 
behavior of many teachers as result of performance pay.  The core of this theme describes how 
teachers understand the possibility of performance pay to influence instructional practices.  
Teachers acknowledged the importance of teaching the state standards and believe that many 
teachers focus solely on mastery of the standards in order to earn performance pay.  Teachers 
suggest that the elimination of performance pay will result in less standards-based instruction 
and ultimately will lead to a decline in student achievement.  This creates an opportunity for 
school district leaders to develop an alternative award system that motivates teachers to improve 
student achievement.  
The third and final theme of the sense of self-efficacy describes teacher perceptions of 
their effectiveness as experienced through their interactions with performance pay.  The 
influence of the participant interactions with performance pay as it relates to their own sense of 
effectiveness is the core of this theme.  Participants value the performance pay they received for 
being identified as effective teachers and feeling appreciated as a result.  Teachers believe that 
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they are effective without the performance pay incentive and that performance pay served as a  
means for their hard work and effectiveness to be acknowledged. 
The need for quality, effective teachers is critical in all schools, but even more so in 
urban schools with predominantly low-socioeconomic and minority students. The elimination of 
an established performance pay system tasks school district leaders to create alternative plans for 
teacher retention and increased student achievement.   Three consecutive years of average but 
effective instruction can completely change the academic trajectory of low-achieving students, 
moving them from the lowest to the highest quartile in academic performance (Schmoker, 2011).  
Consequently, recruiting, developing, and retaining effective teachers must be priorities for 
district leaders.  
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Appendix A 
 
Teacher Interview Protocol 
 
1. Describe your years of experience as a teacher including the numbers of years you have 
been in your current position. 
2. How would you describe your experience with teaching in schools with high minority 
and high poverty student populations?  What thoughts, feelings, and emotions do you 
have about teaching within this context? 
3. How did the school demographics influence your decision to teach in your current 
school?   
4. What were your beliefs about performance pay prior to teaching at your current school? 
5. What are your beliefs about effective teachers being awarded with performance pay? 
a. Do you feel the current system accurately identified and awarded effective 
teachers? 
6. What experiences have you had with performance pay at your current school?   
a. Did your receipt of performance pay influence you to reflect on your own 
practices? 
7. What feelings and emotions were generated from these experiences with performance 
pay? 
8. Describe your understanding of the elimination of performance pay.  
a. How were you informed that this year would be the last year that you were 
eligible to receive performance pay? 
9. What changes in your current position do you associate with the experience of losing 
performance pay? 
10. How does the experience affect your decision to remain at your current school? 
a. Do you anticipate pursuing a teaching position at another school? 
b. Will you pursue employment in the same district or different district?  
c. How will student demographics and student achievement influence your 
employment search? 
11. How will the experience of the elimination of performance pay affect your future 
students? 
12. What changes in instruction do you anticipate with this experience? 
13. What is the significance of performance pay in regard to student achievement? 
14. How has the experience with performance pay affected your values and beliefs as a 
teacher? 
15. What challenges and opportunities do you perceive with the elimination of the 
performance pay program? 
16. How has the experience with performance pay affected your perceptions of teacher 
effectiveness? 
17. What aspects of performance pay affected you the most? 
18. How does performance pay make you feel about your own teaching effectiveness?  
19. Is there anything else you would like me to know? 
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Appendix B 
IRB USE ONLY 
Study Number: 2017-04-0091 
Approval Date: 05/02/2017 
Expires: 05/01/2020 
Name of Funding Agency (if applicable): NA 
 
Consent for Participation in Research 
 
Title: The Influence of the Elimination of Performance Pay on Teachers’ Perceptions on 
Retention and Student Performance at High Needs Campuses 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this form is to provide you information that may affect your decision as to 
whether or not to participate in this research study.  The person performing the research will 
answer any of your questions.  Read the information below and ask any questions you might 
have before deciding whether or not to take part. If you decide to be involved in this study, 
this form will be used to record your consent. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
You have been asked to participate in a research study about teachers’ perceptions on the 
elimination of an established performance pay system.  The purpose of the proposed 
phenomenological study is to determine how effective teachers make sense of performance 
pay through their experiences with the elimination of an established performance-based pay 
system and how these experiences influence teachers’ retention decisions in academically 
low-performing schools with high portions of economically disadvantaged and minority 
students. 
 
What will you be asked to do? 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to: 
• Participate in interviews 
• Review transcribed data from the interviews 
This study will take place in three face-to-face, phone, or interactive video interviews of 
approximately 30-minutes in length.  The study will include up to 15 study participants.  
 
Your participation will be audio recorded.    
 
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this study. 
 
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, findings may be 
used to inform districts’ policies on the development, implementation, and discontinuation of 
performance-based pay systems. 
 
Do you have to participate? 
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No, your participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate at all, or if you start 
the study, you may withdraw at any time.  Withdrawal or refusing to participate will not 
affect your relationship with The University of Texas at Austin (University) in anyway.  
 
If you would like to participate, please provide a verbal consent to the researcher. You will 
receive a copy of this form. 
  
Will there be any compensation? 
You will not receive any type of payment participating in this study.  
 
How will your privacy and confidentiality be protected if you participate in this research 
study? 
Your privacy and the confidentiality of your data will be protected by the researcher referring 
to you with a neutral alias, not disclosing any information you share to other participants, 
ensuring the details of the data cannot be traced to participants, and all data will be locked in 
a secure location. 
 
If it becomes necessary for the Institutional Review Board to review the study records, 
information that can be linked to you will be protected to the extent permitted by law. Your 
data will not be released without your consent unless required by law or a court order. The 
data, which will be masked, resulting from your participation may be made available to other 
researchers in the future for research purposes not detailed within this consent form. In these 
cases, the data will contain no identifying information that could associate it with you, or 
with your participation in any study. 
 
If you choose to participate in this study, you will be audio recorded.  Any audio recordings 
will be stored securely, and only the researcher will have access to the recordings.  
Recordings will be kept for 2 years and then erased.   
 
Whom to contact with questions about the study?   
Prior, during or after your participation you can contact the researcher Keeley Simpson at 903-
278-6337 or send an email to keeley.simpson@utexas.edu for any questions or if you feel that 
you have been harmed.   
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by The University Institutional Review Board and 
the study number is 2017-04-0091. 
 
Whom to contact with questions concerning your rights as a research participant? 
For questions about your rights or any dissatisfaction with any part of this study, you can contact, 
anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board by phone at (512) 471-8871 or email at 
orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu.  
 
Participation 
You have been informed about this study’s purpose, procedures, possible benefits and risks, and 
you have received a copy of this form.  You have been given the opportunity to ask questions, and 
you have been told that you can ask other questions at any time.  You voluntarily agree to 
participate in this study. 
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